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JUDGES UNDER THE SHADOW: JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
AND MEXICO
CARL SCHWARZ*
I. MEXICAN AND UNITED STATES COURTS AS PART
OF "THE DOMINANT POLITICAL ALLIANCE"
Political scientists, comparative lawyers, and other observers
in the United States have long ignored and grossly under-esti-
mated the political importance of the Latin American judicial sys-
tems. Such bodies have been considered as either rubber stamps
for the majority will, as defined by the President, or facades for
the oligarchic dictates of the ancign regime. Anglo-American
scholars assume the dominance of caudillismo (political bossism)
and personalismo in the leadership traits of Latin America to be
simply incompatible with an independent judiciary, particularly on
matters of individual constitutional rights; that is, no judge can
long thwart a course of action to which the regime is committed
or effectively intervene when politically sensitive issues are at
stake. But these simplistic generalizations are founded upon and
indeed have fostered wholly inadequate coverage and analysis of
the courts, key legal actors, and constitutional law in our current
textbooks on Latin American politics.1 First studies relying on
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1. Texts examined were: R. ALEXANDER, TODAY'S LATIN AMERICA (1968),
whose "status of the courts" comprised one-half of a page; J. BUSEY, LATIN
AMERICA: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES (1964), with coverage of
about four pages; A. EDELMAN, LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
(1965), devoting about twenty of 470 pages to "Courts and Law"; J. LAMBERT,
LATIN AMERICA: SOCIAL STRUCTURES AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS (1967), in-
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anecdotal and hearsay evidence, like the rumor-monger in a small
town, have become the unquestioned parents of our community's
image of Latin American judicial processes.' What is lacking is
a systematic comparative focus on the Latin American courts as
important allocators of scarce resources and values within their
respective national political systems8 and as dynamic components
of national political development.4
The all-purpose writ of amparo is widely regarded by Mexi-
cans and foreign legal scholars as the nation's most effective deter-
rent against abuse at all levels of government.' In Mexico as in
cluding about eight pages on "administration of justice and the courts"; M.
NEEDLER, LATIN AMERICAN POLITIcs IN PERSPECTIVE (rev. ed. 1968), containing
about four pages on the subject; A. VON LAZAR, LATIN AMERICAN POLITiCS: A
PRIMER (1971), devoting about four pages to "the judiciary"; and POLITICAL
FORCES IN LATIN AMERICA: DIMENSIONS OF THE QUEST FOR STABILITY (B. Bur-
nett & K. Johnson eds. 1968), including scattered references to judicial or legal
topics, but no systematic treatment either singly or on a country-by-country
basis.
2. A. EDELMANN, supra note 1, at 462, concludes, for example, that "inde-
pendence [of the courts] is a high-sounding phrase in the paper constitutions
and bears little resemblance to reality"; he excepts Brazil (pre-1964), Costa Rica,
and, to a lesser extent, Mexico.
But Professor Edelmann principally supports his contention with references
to the constitutional powers which the President may wield to frustrate judicial
independence. His only evidentiary linkages with the "reality" of such judicial
subordination are a few monographs on individual countries, none of which is or
contains a comprehensive empirical study of the criteria for independence.
These may include: (1) why and how cases are brought, and by whom, (2)
what the courts actually decide and how frequently against the government's
position, (3) the impact of these decisions on the political system, and (4) the
extent to which unpopular decisions of the courts are reversed or unenforced.
See text with notes 5-8 infra, and Theodore Becker's perceptive and pioneering
critique of the existing literature, COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL POLrITCS 161, 210,
et. seq. (1970).
3. See T. BECKER, supra note 2 and passim, for his general comments on
Latin American courts.
4. See Wiarda, Law and Political Development in Latin America: Toward
a Framework for Analysis, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 434 (1971); Karst and Rosenn,
Law and Development in Latin America, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 431 (1971).
5. Adopted by the national government in 1847, the Mexican writ of
amparo has become almost the exclusive instrument for attacking unconstitu-
tional acts committed by officials at either the state or federal level. The writ is
geared to protect primarily the individual rights guaranteed by the first 29 arti-
cles of the Constitution. See LAw OF AMPARO arts. 1, 4. But because of
modern substantive interpretations of articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, the
writ may extend to violations of other constitutional limits on governmental
activity. Through these articles, officials are liable to amparo injunction if they
fail to follow "essential formalities of procedure" and "laws issued prior to the
act" (article 14); they must also demonstrate the competency of their authority
2
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the United States, observers of the federal courts and their exer-
cise of the extraordinary amparo action have not closely and em-
pirically examined the political ramifications and effect of the ju-
dicial process-with one notable exception.' As a step toward
and "the legal basis and justifications for the action taken" (article 16). This is
comparable to the expansion of federal judicial power in the United States
under the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments and the
equal protection clause of the latter. Mexican and Anglo-American scholars see
few formal limits on the applicability of the amparo because of this incorpora-
tion of articles 14 and 16. See I. BURGOA, EL JUICIO DE AMPARO 166-76 (6th
ed. 1968); Cabrera & Headrick, Notes on Judicial Review in Mexico and the
United States, 5 INTER-AMERICAN L. REV. 253 (1963); Fix Zamudio, Algunos as-
pectos comparativos del derecho de amparo en Mexico y Venezuela, LBRO-
HOMENAJE A LA MEMORIA DE LORENZO HERRERA MENDOZA II 334, 344-56
(1970); and consider, e.g.:
[If the federal Congress should enact a tax not included among those
expressly sanctioned by article 73, which sets forth the powers con-
ferred upon the legislative branch, any attempt to collect it would
inflict an injury of the sort envisaged by article 16, and the act could
be voided in amparo.
R. BAKER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MEXICO: A STUDY OF THE AMPARO SUIT 124-25
(1971).
Officials or agencies thus enjoinable in amparo proceedings as "responsible
authorities" include judges, administrative tribunals, bureaucrats functioning in a
ministerial capacity, police officers, legislatures, and even the President of the
Republic. Under articles 14 and 16, they are accountable for the aforemen-
tioned incorrect applications of existing laws as well as for violations of pro-
cedural due process. Laws qua laws which "by their mere promulgation" cause
immediate injury likewise may be challenged as constitutionally defective (called
the amparo contra leyes). LAW OF AMPARO art. 114(l); I. BURGOA, supra, at
604-05.
Unlike erga omnes or class action effects in the United States, however,
amparo judgments affect only the individual parties to the case (i.e., inter partes),
"without making any declaration as to the law or act upon which the complaint
is based." MEXICO CONST. art. 107(11). The only exception is where the Su-
preme Court or circuit courts establish jurisprudencia by deciding the same way
five consecutive times on the same point of law; such jurisprudence or precedent
then binds all regular courts, labor mediation boards, and administrative tribunals
in a fashion similar to the Anglo-American principle of stare decisis. LAw OF
AMPARO arts. 192-93. Each person aggrieved by the offending law or act must
nonetheless litigate his claim separately before the amparo court.
For a brief outline of the direct "legality" amparo, the indirect "legality"
amparo, and the amparo contra leyes, the jurisdiction of the Mexican Supreme
Court regarding all three, and comparisons with extraordinary writ actions in the
United States, see Schwarz, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies under the
Mexican Writ of Amparo, 7 CALF. WEST. L. REV. 331-35 (1971); Schwarz,
Mexican Writ of Amparo: Extraordinary Remedy against Official Abuse of In-
dividual Rights: Parts I & 11, 10-11 PUBLIC AFFAIRS REPORT nos. 6, 1 (1969-70).
6. The notable exception to the dearth of systematic Mexican research on
judicial output is Gonzdlez Casanova, in LA DEMOCRACIA EN MEXICO 29-31 and
Appendices (2d ed. 1967), discussed infra, section V. The best Anglo-American
Vol. 3
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filling such a research gap, this article is devoted to examining the
extent to which the Mexican federal courts, with their exclusive
ampara jurisdiction, are as independent or effective in adjudicat-
ing constitutional-rights cases as their counterparts in the United
States. "Independent" in this article means the inclination of the
courts to decide on their merits "cases and controversies" legiti-
mately presented, pressures exerted by other elements of the po-
litical system notwithstanding.
With a debt to the pioneering works of Theodore Becker
and Donald Kommers, 7 one can posit four criteria by which such
judicial independence can be evaluated on a "cross-national ba-
sis:" (1) the extent to which judges actually exercise their pre-
rogatives against what Robert Dahl has called "the dominant po-
litical alliance,"" and other, localized power elites such as police
and provincial governments; (2) the degree of citizen awareness
of judicial remedies and their tendency to seek such relief when
aggrieved by official action; (3) the frequency with which the
courts' dispositions find support among key politicians, other
judges, at the provincial level, law professors, pressure group lead-
ers-particularly in labor and industry, and journalists with spe-
cialties in public law; and (4) the number of times that officials
work on the amparo in terms of scope and emphasis on some of its political
characteristics is by a political scientist, R. BAKER, supra note 5.
7. D. Kommers, Cross-National Comparisons of Constitutional Courts:
Toward a Theory of Judicial Review, Paper delivered at 69TI ANNUAL MEETING
OF THE AMERICAA POLrrICAL SCIENCE AsSOCIATION at 17-22 (Los Angeles: Sep-
tember, 1970); T. BECKER, supra note 2. The criteria represent a re-ordering and
re-phrasing of Kommer's, based in part on Becker's general argument. Kommer
does not, as does this writer, prefer to link the exercise of judicial review with
determining its effectiveness or impact. His unequivocal statement, "the exer-
cise of judicial review does not of course say anything about its effect" would
appear to miss the political feedback that court decisions often reflect; e.g.,
the "switch in time saving nine" which some observed in the Supreme Court's
post-1937 decisions favoring the Roosevelt Administration and the New Deal,
only after Roosevelt almost succeeded in "packing" the Court because of it's
prior judicial obstruction.
8. Dal, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as Na-
tional Policy-Maker, 6 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW 279 (1957). "Dominant politi-
cal alliance" refers to the coalitions controlling the three branches of the United
States federal government. From his examination of the federal laws struck
down by the Court, Dahl theorizes that the Justices are least likely to block a
strong legislative majority on a major issue and most likely to succeed against a
fragile or transient majority, or on a minor issue. Thus, far from sounding a con-
stant, discordant note in the political system, the Court is an integral part of the
"alliance."
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named in the complaints and their superiors actually comply with
"finalized judicial outputs" meaning decisions affirmed on ap-
peal.' The political independence of the Mexican and United
States federal courts will be measured here primarily in relation
to how the federal courts of Mexico and the United States con-
ceive of their judicial-political roles as expressed in decisions on
constitutional questions presented to them in concrete, individual
cases.
Both the Mexican and United States courts have a wide range
of decisional options when confronted with cases that touch upon
thorny "political questions." At one extreme are decisions not to
decide at all, for fear that any position might not find general pub-
lic acceptance or official enforcement, particularly if against a
major policy or practice of the "dominant political alliance." At
the other extreme is not only the decision to make a constitutional
adjudication, or decide on the merits of the case presented, but a
decision holding that one of those major policies or practices con-
flicts with a principled view of the Constitution. Alexander Bickel
succinctly put the range of choice-and the frequent dilemma-
facing the United States Supreme Court.
The passive devices, producing decisions that fall short of
constitutional adjudication, and constitutional doctrines prop-
erly so called are all points on a continuum of judicial power.
And if, having regard to actual consequences, one views ex-
ercises of the power as ranging from the extreme of a denial
of certiorari at one end to that of the judgment in the School
Desegregation Cases on the other, it is evident that not all
constitutional decisions have the same weight, the same reach,
the same binding equality; not all encounter with equal de-
gree of shock the counter-majoritarian difficulty; some are
nearer the passive end than others.1 0
Before comparing the extent of judicial independence in both
countries, the reader should be alerted to two cautionary points.
First, no judicial system, including that of the United States, is
apt to press for constitutional liberties to the point of encouraging,
in the words of Theodore Becker, "strong antisystem counterelites
(or those perceived as strong)" to carry out their threat of doing
9. See note 7 supra; regarding a general theory of the judicial process as
a "system," see J. A. SIGLER, AN INTRODUCTION To THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1968).
10. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: TIM SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 207 (1962).
Vol. 3
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away with the system itself.1 Professor Dahl discussed United
States courts as part of the dominant political alliance 2 and Alex-
ander Bickel has expressed a similar conclusion visualizing such
a partnership as a real source of the Supreme Court's power.' 3 Up
to that point, however, there are important degrees to which
judges can protect individual rights and minority dissent within
the system.'" Dahl, for example, holds that while "the main task
of the [United States Supreme Court] is to confer legitimacy on
the fundamental policies of the successful coalition," it also serves
to confirm the basic constitutional procedures by which those coali-
tions are formed.' This is, of course, qualification to the point of
contradiction. If the Court can establish those procedural guide-
lines albeit within a consensual context, then may it not also
thwart major policy goals of the regime which, in the minds of
the justices, run counter to the proper decision-making proce-
dure? Even Dahl admits that "the Court operates to confer le-
gitimacy, not simply on the particular and parochial policies of
the dominant alliance, but upon the basic patterns of behavior re-
quired for the operation of a democracy."' 6
Studies of certain high courts of Latin America have yielded
similar findings. Although generally disdainful of the political
subordination of Latin American judicial systems, Professor
Jacque Lambert concedes that some courts are effective in "brak-
ing" high-handed administrative actions through devices such as
amparo and the imported habeas corpus. He concludes that
11. T. BECKER, supra note 2, at 165. Consider, e.g., the difficulties in
judicial prevention or control of using national emergency measures that exceed
what is necessary to restore order; i.e., adopting judicial review on the basis of
"the less-restrictive alternative test." Developments in the Law: The National
Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1130, 1293-1303 (1972).
12. Dahl, supra note 8, at 294-95.
13. A. BicKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 173-81
(1970).
14. See T. BECKER, supra note 2, at 166-67:
Once we recognize that in no system will courts protect freedom of
speech, assembly, and the like geared to doing away with the system
when there is the slightest chance that this speech might actually gen-
erate the action it calls for, we can begin to talk about the degrees to
which courts protect individual policy and subsystem disagreement
within the system. Courts frequently are employed for this purpose-
and the more independent the judiciary, the more likely that they will
be employed in this way. . . . The one prerequisite to this mainte-
nance of individual liberties against governmental oppression is a low
threshold of popular outrage toward such actions developed among the
citizenry as a whole or among society's influentials.
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"there does exist a tradition of true judicial independence" in eight
countries (including Mexico) as of 1967, on matters such as
property rights and the arrest of political opponents.
17
A second precaution: judicial independence cannot be meas-
ured strictly by the extent to which the courts challenge statutes,
executive decrees, and administrative regulations as inherently un-
constitutional; that is, by the extent of judicial review as tradi-
tionally defined. Judicial independence also should be tested
through measuring how frequently illegal or constitutionally im-
permissible official practices are judicially attacked by way of ex-
traordinary writ proceedings like the Mexican amparo or Anglo-
American habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, and certiorari.
Indeed, many of the United States Supreme Court's most contro-
versial decisions have not struck at laws qua laws at all, "only"
at state and federal procedures for arresting, arraigning, and pros-
ecuting suspected criminals; that is, official actions held to be in
violation of the due process guarantees of the Federal Constitu-
tion's fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments.18  When scrutiny is
limited to the formal review powers of courts, especially supreme
courts, one "utterly bypasses the daily low-level, eyeball-to-
eyeball confrontation of the government and the governed at the
local level through judicial administration of the law."'19 This is
particularly important in evaluating the efficacy of the Mexican
amparo writ.
With these precautions in mind, this article shall determine
to what extent the United States Supreme Court and its Mexican
counterpart experience in common the tension "between the prin-
cipled universe of 'logic' and the expedient requirements of 'ex-
perience.' "20 The respective responses of the two courts to this
tension can best be disclosed and compared by charting the sub-
ject matter areas and the frequency with which they choose both
ends of Professor Bickel's "continuum." The doctrines of po-
litical questions, and committed-to-agency-discretion, are at the
passive end of that continuum in the Anglo-American courts, and
will be developed in the next section as reference points for finding
17. J. LAMBERT, supra note 1, at 294-95.
18. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
19. T. BECKER, supra note 2, at 212.
20. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Inter-
sections between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 236 (1968).
Vol. 3
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the extent of passivity in the Mexican amparo courts. Section III
is an effort to delineate the Mexican equivalent of the United
States' political question, the extent of their modification by the
amparo courts, and how they compare with cases subject to judi-
cial activism in the United States. Section IV will draw conclu-
sions concerning the growing independence of the Mexican am-
paro courts in certain issue areas, particularly as they compare with
areas of limited reviewability in the federal courts of the United
States. The final section will chart the middle-range of options
facing judges of both nations' judiciaries: where the judges, es-
pecially those of the Supreme Courts, veer toward either judicial
activism or judicial modesty in deciding politically important or
government-involved cases on their merits.
II. UNITED STATES DOCTRINES OF NON-REVIEWABILITY:
VARYING CONCERNS FOR "SOVEREIGNTY" AND "EXPEDIENCY"
Under the political questions doctrine, the United States Su-
preme Court reaches the most extreme end of the scale on judicial
self-restraint. It does so by disclaiming any responsibility for ad-
judicating an issue in the present and in the future on the ground
that the case would better be resolved by the elective branches of
the state or federal government. 21 Political questions differs from
its twin doctrine of non-reviewability, committed-to-agency-discre-
tion, in that it is judicially created, technically more deferential to
the official policy-makers being challenged, and not restricted to
the actions of federal administrative agencies.22 However, many
of the cases in which the committed-to-agency-discretion rationale
has been adopted overlap with those in which a political ques-
tions analysis is appropriate; therefore they will be discussed to-
gether.
Both doctrines of non-reviewability are unique in the perma-
nence of their effect. When the High Court denies a writ of
21. Some of the leading analyses of the doctrine are: Powell v. McCor-
mack, 395 U.S. 486, 512-50 (1969) (majority opinion per Warren, C.J.); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (majority opinion per Brennan, J.); A. BicKEL,
supra note 10, at 183-98; P. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 192-209 (1953); M. SHAPIRo, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE
SUPREME COURT ch. 5 (1964); Sharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Ques-
tion: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966); Tigar, Judicial Power,
The "Political Questions" Doctrine, and Foreign Relations, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1135 (1970).
22. See discussion in section II B. inf ra.
1973
8
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2 [1973], Art. 19
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol3/iss2/19
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JouRNAL
certiorari or standing to sue on grounds other than those for non-
reviewability, it has found only that the issue has not ripened, the
petitioner lacks a concrete injury, his administrative remedies have
not been exhausted, or that he has proper recourse via the ab-
stention doctrine to state courts on matters of state law. In such
cases, the litigant or a better party might well expect to return one
day to the forum of the Court.23 But "[o]nce the political ques-
tions doctrine has been applied to a particular issue, the rules of
precedent and of stare decisis come into play and will prevent a
judicial determination of this issue in future cases."' 24  Thus, the
political question "is not premised upon the specific constellation
of the individual case; it attaches to the issue itself."25  Essentially
the same point can be made for committed-to-agency-discretion. 6
Difficult to define operationally are the issues to which judi-
cial non-reviewability attaches. What one recent observer notes
in regard to political questions may also be applied to issues for
agency discretion:
[It] does not seem to be a doctrine at all, but a group of
quite different legal rules and principles, each resting in part
upon deference to the political branches of government. Such
an assertion, however, while setting forth a characteristic of
the political questions cases, does not uniquely describe
them.
27
A. The Political Questions Doctrine
Although constituting the most specific reference by which
to compare non-reviewability rationale in other countries, classi-
fication of political questions by subject matter or issue area is
also the easiest to perforate with exceptions. In Baker v. Carr,8
the landmark reapportionment case and itself an erosion of a tradi-
tionally non-justiciable area, Justice Brennan defined five major
23. Plaintiffs attacking the statutory ban on birth control devices in Con-
necticut, for example, were first denied standing for their failure to show "con-
crete injury" (Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943) ), then put off because
the issue was insufficiently "ripe" for adjudication (Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497
(1961)). They finally gained access upon being tried and sentenced under the
offending statute (Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) ).
24. Sharpf, supra note 21, at 537-38; see also M. SHAPimo, supra note 21,
at 190.
25. Sharpf, supra note 21, at 537.
26. See text and notes 101-03 infra.
27. Tigar, supra note 21, at 1163.
28. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Vol. 3
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categories: United States foreign relations, dates of the duration
of hostilities, validity of legislative enactments, the status of Indian
tribes, and "republican" forms of government. Professor Fritz
Sharpf expanded these into seventeen separate issue areas. 9 His
list shows that the great bulk of "political questions" have been
declared in the area of foreign relations law, and within this
field, "questions of international and domestic law which imme-
diately concern the political and military interactions of the United
States and foreign states.""0  But even in this "airtight" category
of political questions there are notable exceptions to the Court's
exercise of the doctrine. Sharpf himself inserts the word "per-
haps" before three of these foreign-relations issue areas. 1 There
are other exceptions where the federal courts have not completely
subordinated individual property or civil rights to the Executive
Branch's interpretations of treaties and policies toward foreign
governments.32
Recognition of inconsistencies in applying traditional subject
matter categories forces consideration of other, more functional cri-
teria for distinguishing political questions from otherwise unre-
lated cases. Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr introduces six "ana-
lytical threads" demarcating proper application of the doctrine,
in five of which little rigor can be found. 3 To Professor Sha-
29. The validity of treaties under international and foreign constitu-
tional law; the validity of federal statutes under international law;
the international boundaries of the United States; the territorial sover-
eignty of foreign states; the existence of foreign insurgents, belligerants,
and governments (de facto and de jure) and states; the effect which
American courts should accord to acts of foreign insurgents, belliger-
ents, and governments; the immunity of foreign diplomats and of for-
eign state-owned or operated vessels; the constitutionality of the exclu-
sion and expulsion of aliens; the legality of a license for airline service
abroad; the duration of the civil war (or war generally); the existence
of a state of facts justifying an exercise of the war power against alien
enemies, and against citizens suspected of participating in an insurrec-
tion; the necessity of continuing federal protection of Indians in a proc-
ess of assimilation; the recognition of competing groups or persons as
the lawful government or officers of a state; the validity of state laws
under the republican-form-of-government clause of the Constitution
(Guaranty Clause); the validity of statutes allegedly enacted in viola-
tion of procedural requirements; the validity of ratifications of a con-
stitutional amendment; until Baker v. Carr, the constitutionality of
state reapportionment statutes.
Sharpf, supra note 21, at 537 n.69.
30. Id. at 596.
3t. Id. at 537 n.69.
32. See, e.g., notes 261-62 and accompanying text infra.
33. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). "Threads" two through six have little
rigor if only because the Court itself has so often appeared to ignore them.
These are: (2) a "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards" for
1973
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piro, "one of the few relatively successful rationales for political
questions"34 is Justice Brennan's first and most emphasized cri-
terion: a political question exists when there is "a textually de-
monstrable commitment of the issue to a coordinate political de-
partment." That is, a specific reference to the separation of pow-
ers principal of the Constitution. Such deference on constitu-
tional grounds does indeed appear as a theme in almost all the
political questions cases, domestic as well as foreign.8 5
Unfortunately for the rigor of the separation of powers ra-
tionale, two major difficulties appear. First, such a thread does not
satisfactorily explain the Court's withdrawal from the Guarantee
Clause cases-those in which existing state governments were at-
tacked as not "republican" in the sense of article IV of the Federal
Constitution. 6 Second, there are too many exceptions to the
Court's ambiguous abstention in the presence of any "textually
demonstrable commitment" to the two national branches of gov-
ernment. The most dramatic blows, not only to the separation of
powers criterion as stated in Baker, but to the political questions
resolving the case; (3) "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial dscreton;" (4) a threat of "ex-
pressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of government;" (5) "an un-
usual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;"
and (6) "the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question," or the danger of speaking with more than
one voice especially in foreign relations matters.
34. M. SHAPiRo, supra note 21, at 206.
35. As Justice Brennan put it in Baker v. .Carr, "the non-justiciability of a
political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers." 369 U.S.
186, 217 (1962). There are indeed many examples of where the Court deferred
to the powers of Congress or the President in declaring "political questions";
such as complaints that (1) Kansas took too long to ratify an amendment to the
Federal Constitution (Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) ); (2) an "en-
rolled statute" appearing to differ from the bill originally passed was invalid
(Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) ); (3) an incumbent Rhode Island gov-
ernment should be denied Congressional representation and unseated because it
lacked the requisite "republican" character under the Constitution (Luther v.
Borden, 7 How. 1 (1849)); and (4) Congress invalidly abrogated a Chinese-
U.S. treaty by restricting immigration quotas after the treaty went into effect
(the Chinese Exclusion Cases, 130 U.S. 581, 602, et. seq. (1889) ).
36. The key issue for Chief Justice Taney in Luther v. Borden, was
really not the challenge to Congress or the Presidency. It was, inter alia, the
difficulty in choosing between a rebellious "republican" faction and the incum-
bent "legitimate" government of Rhode Island. The Court, said Taney, could
not possibly find "controlling points of law" sufficient to establish the propriety
of conflicting claims. 7 How. 1, 10, 14-15 (1849). In Pacific Telephone v.
Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912), likewise, the Court found a political question for
reasons other than concern for Congress's power. See text with note 71 infra.
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doctrine generally, came with Powell v. McCormack87 and the
more recent Pentagon Papers cases.8" In Powell, Chief Justice
Warren with the support of seven other Justices told Congress
that it could not exclude, by majority vote, a duly elected member
on grounds other than those of age, citizenship, and residence as
specified in the Constitution. The Supreme Court's intervention
and finding in favor of Powell, like the Reapportionment Cases
and the later precedent of Bond v. Floyd, 9 thus greatly undercut
all justifications of political question rulings in challenges of legis-
lative prerogatives. Powell, however, represented a particularly
dramatic departure, directly challenging the Congress's authority
over its own membership as well as the latter's interpretation of
internal operating procedures.40 The Pentagon Papers cases like-
wise signify a direct confrontation with the Executive Branch, deal-
ing not only with the release of classified materials on the history
of the Vietnam War-that is, a sensitive foreign relations matter
-but the internal classification procedures themselves. Over the
argument of three Justices' that "the very nature of executive deci-
sions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial," the Court
squelched Government attempts to enjoin publication of docu-
ments "leaked" to the Washington Post and New York Times.4"
Decrying the lack of explanatory rigor in the separation of
powers justification, Professor Martin Shapiro asserts that the only
pattern left in political questions cases is the Court's refusal to ad-
judicate "issues of basic sovereignty," where the Court is called
to judge the validity or viability of whole governments, whether
these be state, national or foreign.4 2 The sovereignty rationale in
United States political question cases appears similar to the tradi-
tional civil-law restriction on the Mexican federal courts: that
the judiciary cannot assume what is essentially a legislative pre-
rogative in determining who has the ultimate power or sovereignty
37. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
38. New York Times Co. v. United States, United States v. Washington
Post Co., 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
39. 385 U.S. 116 (1966), wherein the Court enjoined, on remand, the
Georgia Legislature from excluding a legislator because of his expressed opposi-
tion to United States actions in Vietnam.
40. See Symposium, Comments on Powell v. McCormack, 17 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 1 (1969).
41. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (dissenting opinion of Harlan, J.); see also
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
42. M. SHAPIRO, supra note 21, at 176-85.
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to make laws.43 For example, just as the United States Court said
it lacked authority to pass on the President's recognition of a for-
eign government,44 even if recognition validates the seizure and
sale of property owned by United States citizens, 5 so also would
it not question whether the existing government of Oregon was not
"republican" because of its adopting of initiative and referendum
procedures. 46  "[A]n analysis of the subject matter of 'political
questions' cases therefore suggests that 'political' for the Court
means basically not the interpretation and constitutional review of
laws but the very existence of laws or legal systems."47
There are several reasons why this thesis involving sover-
eignty should be adopted with caution. First, it does not com-
pletely account for Justice Brennan's sweeping dictum in Baker
v. Carr that all political questions in the future will be limited to
separation of powers issues; that is, no state action ordinarily reach-
able through the fourteenth amendment shall be immunized from
federal judicial scrutiny.4s According to Professor Sharpf:
Potentially the most far reaching expansion of the doctrine
into the field of reapportionment has been reversed on
grounds that may well militate against the further vitality of
the political question even for questions arising under the
Guarantee Clause.49
Second, like Baker's impact on the Guarantee Clause issue
area, Powell v. McCormack threatens the future validity of sover-
43. This principle is reflected in article 107 (II) of the Mexican Constitu-
tion, which states:
[T]he judgment [in amparo] shall always be such that it affects only
private individuals, being limited to affording them redress and protec-
tion in the special case to which the complaint refers, without making
any general declaration about the law or act on which the complaint is
based.
See R. BAKER, supra note 5, at 269-71; and analysis of political rights as non-
justiciable in Mexico, text with notes 155-67 infra.
44. Rose v. Himeley, 4 Cranch 241 (1808).
45. Oetjen v. Central Leather Company, 246 U.S. 297 (1918); see also
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
46. Pacific Telephone v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 150-51 (1912).
47. M. SHAPIRo, supra note 21, at 180.
48. Justice Brennan's warning was direct:
Our review reveals that in the Guaranty Clause cases and in the other"political questions" cases, it is the relationship between the judiciary
and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government, and not the
federal judiciary's relationship to the states, which gives rise to the
"political question." .. . . We have no question decided or to be de-
cided by a political branch of government coequal with this Court.
369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962) (emphasis added).
49. Sharpf, supra note 21, at 596.
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eignty in the so-called "enactment cases" where the Court refused
to void Kansas's belated ratification of the Child Labor Amend-
ment50 or to consider whether an "enrolled statute" differed from
the original passed by Congress. 51 One might question whether
the sovereignty thesis is still the reason for judicial abstinence on
such issues in light of the Powell decision. If the Court can pro-
hibit Congress from excluding a member like Powell for extra-con-
stitutional reasons, as defined by the Justices, then may not that
same Court also prohibit Congress from "excluding" as well a
belatedly ratified amendment or questionable statute? And if it
can prohibit such exclusions, might it not also compel Congress to
accept those questionable enactments?
Third, the Supreme Court's traditional stance that federal
taxpayers' suits constitute political questions received a recent jolt
with Flast v. Cohen.52  Under Frothingham v. Mellon5" and other
cases 54 petitioners protesting state and Congressional expendi-
tures for wars, religious programs and welfare policies were long
denied standing to sue in the federal courts on the ground that
such suits touched on "the highest attribute of sovereignty," the
power to tax.55 In Flast the Court finally held that a plaintiff
had standing to challenge a federal spending program if he could
show that Congress violated a specific limitation on its taxing and
spending power; the limitation in this case being the Establish-
ment and Free Exercise of Religion clauses of the first amend-
ment.56 Justice Stewart concurred:
50. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
51. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
52. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
53. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
54. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), dismissing Massachu-
setts' complaint that her sovereignty was violated by Congressional taxation
supporting the Maternity Act of 1921; the Frothingham doctrine apparently
moved an appellate court to invoke political questions in a taxpayer's suit against
military spending in Vietnam, Sarnoff v. Shultz, 457 F.2d 809, cert. denied,
409 U.S. 929 (1972); suits against state tax laws were similarly prevented in
South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 186 (1904) and Doremus v. Board of
Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952). Federal non-reviewability here becomes inter-
twined with the doctrine of "deferral": federal district courts are statutorily
prevented from reviewing state tax policies, unless effective remedies are lacking.
28 U.S.C. 1341 (1970). Unless interfering with interstate commerce or other
federal statutes, levies of public utility rates are similarly "deferred." 28 U.S.C.
1342 (1970).
55. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 319 (1904).
56. 392 U.S. 83, 105 (1968).
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The present case is thus readily distinguishable from Froth-
ingham . . . where the taxpayer did not rely on an explicit
constitutional prohibition but instead questioned the scope of
the powers delegated to the national legislature by Article
I of the Constitution.U7
Fourth, it is difficult to see how some of the alien-rights
cases where the Court has invoked the doctrine have anything to
do with the sovereignty of one country in relation to another. In
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy and Galvan v. Press5" the Justices
wrestled with the issue of whether resident aliens could be de-
ported for past membership in the Communist Party under the
Alien Registration Act of 1950, even if such membership was ter-
minated long before the statute's enactment. Although in Galvan
Justice Frankfurter chose to invoke the doctrine of political ques-
tions, he did so with heavy emphasis on the separation of powers ra-
tionale, speaking little of the issue being "vital" to the sovereignty
of the United States or any other country.59 Furthermore, at the
opposite end of the spectrum from political questions are deci-
sions at least marginally related to alien rights but in which the
Court nonetheless has taken an activist stand against govern-
ment policy. 0 In Afroyim v. Rusk the Court invalidated a con-
gressional statute and overruled precedent barely nine years old
with the comment:
We reject the idea expressed in Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S.
44 (1958), that, aside from the Fourteenth Amendment,
Congress has any general power, expressed or implied, to
take away an American citizen's citizenship without his as-
sent. This power cannot, as Perez indicated, be sustained
as an implied attribute of sovereignty possessed by all na-
tions .... 61
These cases can be coupled with those in which the Court has up-
held aliens' claims of substantive and procedural rights violated
57. Id. at 114.
58. 342 U.S. 580 (1952); 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
59. 347 U.S. 522, 530-32 (1952); but see Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580 (1952).
60. These cases involved claims brought by those denied their citizenship
for various statutory reasons including defection to a foreign country to avoid
military service (Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) ), re-
maining in the petitioner's country of birth for more than three years (Schneider
v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964) ), and voting in a foreign election (Afroyim v.
Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) ).
61. 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967) (emphasis added).
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during extradition and exclusion proceedings. 2 Together they
question any abiding judicial concern for issues of sovereignty
as weighed against the irreparable loss of citizenship or residence
suffered at the hands of some "foreign policy."
The varying application of the political questions doctrine
casts doubt upon even the functional criteria of Professor Sharpf.
To Sharpf, three factors and considerations, "in various combina-
tions, may persuade the Court that in deciding a particular issue it
would overreach the limits of its own responsibility." 6 These
are: 64 (1) difficulties for the Court having full access to infor-
mation about the case; 5 (2) the need for uniformity of decision
by the United States government, or the danger of "speaking with
more than one voice;"66 and (3) the need to defer to the wider
duties of the political departments, or the rationale of "embar-
rassment. '6 7  But, as Professor Sharpf admits, these functional
criteria for political questions have little applicability beyond for-
eign relations and national security law, and even here he sees po-
litical questions as generally giving way to judicial review "when
important individual rights are at stake."6 8
There are thus few consistencies or certainties in the Su-
preme Court's application of the so-called political questions doc-
trine, at least not from the standpoint of subject matter classifica-
tions, Brennan's analytical threads, Shapiro's notion of sovereignty,
or Sharpf's functionalism in domestic law cases. Rather, it seems
that the Court, in delineating individual cases as "off limits" to
62. See notes 173-74, 246-55 and accompanying text infra.
63. Sharpf, supra note 21, at 567.
64. See id. at 566-83.
65. E.g., where the President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the na-
tion's organ for foreign affairs, has intelligence services available whose reports
are not and ought not be published to the world. Thus, in a controversy arising
from a C.A.B. decision on a foreign air route, it was held to be "intolerable
that courts, without relevant information should review and perhaps nullify ac-
tions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret." Chicago and
Southern Airlines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
66. E.g., where the Court is asked to choose whether a foreign government
"recognized" by the Executive possessed sufficient status, as such, to validly
confiscate property of United States citizens. See Oetjen v. Central Leather
Company, 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
67. E.g., where the Court felt it could not stop the President from enforcing
the Reconstruction Acts because it could not then protect him from impeachment
once he had obeyed the Court's order. Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475, 501
(1867).
68. Sharpf, supra note 21, at 584.
1973
16
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2 [1973], Art. 19
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol3/iss2/19
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JouRNAL
review, has linked something like Shapiro's sovereignty idea with
that of expediency, or the Justices' concern for the ultimate en-
forceability of a decision on the merits. It is plausible that be-
hind the Court's frequently expressed desire to avoid clashes of
sovereignties there is a well-founded fear that decision in those
cases would not find minimal consensus among the key opinion
leaders or government agencies-a sufficient consensus, at any
rate, to make those decisions effective. In this light, the real
function of finding a political question is to provide another "way
out" of potentially difficult conflicts with other branches of gov-
ernment, particularly the federal government. It has, then, a
"passive virtue" role similar to denials of certiorari, dismissals of
appeals for want of a substantial federal question, a lack of ripe-
ness or standing on other than political question grounds, or in-
sistence on prior exhaustion of remedies.
It is far too simple to assert, however, that political questions
are dictated solely by a "hot potato" or "opportunistic" theory of
judicial decision-making. In criticizing Alexander Bickel on
this point, Professor Sharpf makes two arguments why political
questions cannot be so easily explained: (1) the Court has too
many other devices, those mentioned above, for avoiding decisions
and (2) it has already decided too many cases which werq really
"hotter" or more politically sensitive at the time than those tapped
by the insulating wand of political questions.6 9 For Martin Sha-
piro, too:
The Court labels "political" a decision on who owns the
Falkland Islands for purposes of settling a marine insurance
claim or on whether or not Nebraska has ratified the Child
Labor Amendment, but it does decide cases like Dred Scott,
the income tax case, the school desegregation cases, and
Dennis v. United States. It may well be true that the Court
has occasionally used the "political questions" doctrine as
one of its many devices for avoiding "hot ones," but it is
impossible to predict whether questions are or are not going
to be labeled "political' by comparing their fever charts. 70
Such a conclusion underestimates the impact of marked polit-
ical circumstances which must have influenced the Court's deliber-
ations on many, though certainly not all, of the major political
questions cases outside as well as within the foreign relations area.
69. Id. at 533-38.
70. M. SHAPiRo, supra note 21 at 184.
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It seems safe to assume, for example, that no matter how the Court
would have been justified in deciding a guarantee clause case in-
volving the legitimacy of the initiative and referendum petitions in
1912,71 it would not have risked so bold a stroke against a funda-
mental plank of the then "dominant" Progressive movement.
Similarly, Chief Justice Marshall did not directly void the appli-
cation of Georgia law in Cherokee Indian territory, especially
since he knew full well that President Andrew Jackson would not
enforce such a decision.72 In 1869, the Court passed to Congress
the final determination of Texas's status in the Union, citing Lu-
ther v. Borden, one of the guarantee clause cases. 73  But to fur-
ther placate the Radical Republican majority of Congress, Chief
Justice Chase said that in terms of the state's standing to recover
U.S. bonds, "Texas never left the Union. ' 74  Strong prospective
hostility from the Congress must also have figured in the Court's
refusal to void enforcement of the Reconstruction Acts in the
plaintiff states of the old Confederacy, 75 or to strike a duly en-
rolled statute regardless of the alleged prima facie conflict with
the original, 76 or to countermand a state governor's announced re-
fusal to extradite an escaped slave under the Fugitive Slave Law.
77
71. Pacific Telephone v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
72. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Peters 1 (1831). According to John
Frank, "the status of the Indian tribes became a political question because Mar-
shall realized that Jackson and the State of Georgia had no intention of letting
the judiciary solve the problems of the Cherokees." Frank, What is a Political
Question, in THE COURTS, A READER IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 387 (R. Scigliano
ed. 1962). After Marshall finally did step in to protect the Cherokee "nation,"
in Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Peters 515 (1832), President Jackson reportedly made
his famous reply, "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it."
H. J. CARMAN et al., A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE I 365 (2d ed.
1961).
73. Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700 (1869).
74. Id. at 719-36.
75. Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50 (1867); Mississippi v. Stanton, 4 Wall.
475 (1867).
76. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
77. Kentucky v. Denmison, 24 How. 66 (1861). The time was 1861, a
year charged with emotion over slavery and imminent civil war. The law under
which Kentucky demanded extradition was the Fugitive Slave Law; any court
would have incurred great wrath from both sides had it decided this question.
Moreover, in this particular case the Court would have had to countervail the
flat prior refusal by the Governor of Ohio to enforce any decision going against
him. On the other hand, the Court was faced also with a constitutional com-
mand which could not be any more specific: that any person or slave fleeing
from an "offense" in another state "shall on demand of the executive authority
of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, on claim of the party to whom
1973
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In the enactment case of Coleman v. Miller,78 the Court
yielded to severe political pressures by not deciding whether Kan-
sas had taken too long to ratify the proposed Child Labor Amend-
ment. The amendment itself was an effort to override the Court's
1918 decision invalidating Congressional regulation of child labor
practices in the states.7" That the Court found a political question
in Coleman was entirely consistent with concurrent moves gener-
ally away from further conflict with the social and economic "re-
covery-and-reform" programs of the New Deal.8" As the majority
opinion itself perceived "the nature of the times:"
When a proposed amendment springs from a conception of
economic needs, it would be necessary in determining
whether a reasonable time has elapsed since its submission,
to consider economic conditions prevailing in the country
... . In short, the question of reasonable time in many
cases would involve, as in this case it does involve, an ap-
praisal of a great variety of relevant conditions .. .which
can hardly be said to be within the appropriate range of
[judicial] evidence .... 81
Judicial submission to Congressional authority and public opinion
in the Alien Registration Act cases 82 can be similarly explained.
Here alien petitioners, all long-time residents of the United States,
protested their deportation for association with the Communist
party. The cases were decided in the early 1950's, the time of the
Korean War, the height of the McCarthy frenzy, and the heyday
of the philosophically conservative majority of Justices Vinson,
Clark, Burton, Minton, and Reed (joined on occasion by Justices
Frankfurter and Jackson). This was the same Court that had al-
such service or labour may be due .... ."U.S. CONST. art. IV. The Court, on
the horns of a dilemma, did the only expedient thing: it avoided deciding an
issue which already helped put the country on the abyss of civil war.
78. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
79. Hammar v. Dagenhart, 297 U.S. 251 (1918).
80. The Coleman non-decision was in part reflective of the "switch in time"
by the Court favorably responding to Franklin Roosevelt's landslide victory in the
1937 election and his subsequent, nearly successful effort to "pack the court."
Robert McCloskey described the result:
The crucial point is [regarding the post-1937 period] that the Court's
doctrines were no longer set up as a barrier against regulations as such.
The question of whether America should become a welfare state was
now referred directly to the political branches of government.
R. McCLosKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 187 (1960).
81. 307 U.S. 433, 444 (1939).
82. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952), Galvan v. Press,
347 U.S. 522 (1954), both discussed in text with notes 58-59 supra.
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ready legitimized, though not via political questions, government
prosecutions of internal Communist threats83 and broad congres-
sional latitude to deny full hearings to excluded aliens.84 One
appellant had shown no Communist ties since 1929, but Justice
Jackson nonetheless denied relief, standing on the now-familiar
ground of government sovereignty:
[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately inter-
woven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the con-
duct of foreign relations, the war power, and the main-
tenancy of a republican form of government. Such matters
are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of gov-
ernment as to largely immunize them from judicial inquiry
or interference.
85
As a rationale for political questions, however, sovereignty seems
to have little bearing on this kind of dispute.8 6 John Frank's
pointed remark regarding Justice Jackson's reasoning is a re-
minder that other, extra-judicial factors probably intervened in
that case:
The Court either has a duty to review or it does not. If it
does have a duty, then it should excuse itself for some clear-
cut and categorical reasons and not for some misty notion
about the distribution of power. To find a shade of a shadow
of a scintilla of a reason for thus treating a human being
because of anything in Luther v. Borden or in the Water-
man Steam Ship case seems to me all wrong.
87
Refusals by the Court to consider attacks on the constitution-
ality of United States involvement in Vietnam presents a current
example of expediency and sovereignty as combined explanations
for non-reviewability in the United States. In Mora v. McNa-
mara8 8 and McArthur v. Clifford,"9 the Supreme Court denied cer-
tiorari to a pair of draft-resisters challenging the President's inter-
vention in Vietnam on the basis that Congress had not declared
83. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); American Communica-
tions Co. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). See also Feiner v. New York,
340 U.S. 315 (1951), affirming the conviction of a leftist speaker for prompting
"angry muttering and pushing" by the crowd.
84. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
85. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89.
86. See Critique of Martin Shapiro's thesis in text with notes 58-59 supra.
87. Frank, supra note 72, at 390.
88. 389 U.S. 934 (1967).
89. 393 U.S. 1002 (1968).
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war. In Massachusetts v. Laird,90 the state legislature sought
declaratory judgment relief on the same grounds, and likewise
asked that the Secretary of Defense be enjoined from "carrying out,
issuing, or causing to be issued any further order directing any
inhabitant of the [state] to Indochina for the purpose of partici-
pating in combat or supporting combat troops in the Vietnam
war."991  Thus, the cases involve committed-to-agency-discretion
doctrine as well as a political question because the petitioners at-
tacked the conscription authority of the Defense Secretary.92  The
rationale for non-reviewability in all three Vietnam-war challenges
apears the same as other political questions cases: they deal
with issues and circumstances of such political explosiveness that
they could ultimately prevent a viable remedy for the litigants.93
Whether one looks at these cases as avoidances of funda-
mental questions of sovereignty, or "hot potatoes," or both, one
must nonetheless see them as more than acts of sheer expediency.
There are, to be sure, alternative ways of saying that, given the
vulnerability of the Supreme Court to outside political restraints,
it is often necessary for it to resort to experience, rather than
principled logic as being the whole course of the common law.
94
The ultimate concern is that a judicial decision on the merits of
the petitioner's grievance would irreparably damage the prestige,
strength, and independence of the Federal Judiciary at that par-
ticular point in time. Apt here is John Roche's summary of the
value of all measures for implementing judicial self-restraint, in-
cluding the doctrine of political questions:
Judicial self-restraint and judicial power seem to be the op-
posite sides of the same coin: it has been by judicious ap-
plication of the former that the latter has been maintained.
90. 400 U.S. 886 (1970).
91. Id. at 129.
92. See section 11 B infra.
93. See Justice Douglas's lengthy dissent in Massachusetts v. Laird, 400
U.S. 886-900 (1970), in which he questions the grounds of lack of standing
and non-justiciability in the per curiam denial of certiorari; e.g., at 135:
The Solicitor General urges that no effective remedy can be formulated.
He correctly points out enforcing or supervising injunctive relief would
involve immense complexities and difficulties. But there is no require-
ment that we issue an injunction. . . . I restrict this opinion to the
question of the propriety of a declaratory judgment that no Massachu-
setts man can be taken against his will and made to serve in that war.
Powell involved just one man while this case involves large numbers of
men. But that goes only to the mechanical task of making any
remedy granted available to all members of a large class.
94. See generally, Deutsch, supra note 20.
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A tradition beginning with Marshall's coup in Marbury v.
Madison . . . suggests that the Court's power has been main-
tained by a wise refusal to employ it in unequal combat.95
Thus, particularly in issues concerning basic sovereignty, the
device of political questions becomes another means for a struc-
turally undemocratic agency of government to perform a demo-
cratic function. By avoiding such "self-inflicted wounds" as the
Dred Scott, Legal Tender, and Income Tax decisions of the Nine-
teenth Century and the anti-New Deal holdings of 1935-1937,96
the Court feels that it can more consistently protect constitutional
rights and liberties in the future.97
95. Roche, Judicial Self-Restraint, in THE COURTS: A READER IN THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 71, at 384.
96. The phrase, "self-inflicted wounds", refers to three decisions which so
went against the tide of political and economic reform at the times they were
decided that the Court lost its respect and credibility as the national arbiter of
the Constitution for years to come. These decisions were Dred Scott v. Sanford
in 1857, declaring slaves to be constitutionally unprotected and thus nullifying
the Missouri Compromise of 1820; the Legal Tender Case (Hepburn v. Gris-
wold, 8 Wall. 603 (1870)), striking down the "greenback" redemption act as un-
constitutional; and the Income Tax Cases (Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust
Co., 157 U.S. 429, 158 U.S. 601 (1895) ), invalidating the nation's first compre-
hensive personal income tax statute. E.S. CORWIN, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY 138 (A. Mason and G. Garvey eds. 1964). The difficulties for the
Court in getting these "backward" cases accepted by the public were compounded
by the great divisions on the Court itself. Corwin also suggests that the several
Supreme Court decisions against the New Deal constitute a fourth "self-in-
flicted wound." Id. at 134-38.
97. All this does not miss the real danger, of course, in promoting judicial
self-restraint and non-reviewability in particular. The workings of stare decisis
may too easily elevate a restrictive decision into a category closed to future (or
near-future) adjudication. Political questions cases are particularly suscepti-
ble to this kind of transcendental result. The Court's view that draft-resisters'
claims on Vietnam are too closely bound up with the great issues of national
security, and thus subject to summary dismissal, seems too facile. Like the
alien-rights cases of the 1950's, it compresses the subject matter of such claims
into the broad analytical category of separation of powers or sovereignty with-
out sufficient regard for the unique circumstances and rights of each petitioner.
It would seem that as constitutional arbiter the Court should open up for
scrutiny the substance of policies, even one delicately interwined with national
defense, when the choice is to sacrifice the guarantee of each citizen or alien to
the fundamentals of procedural fairness in all administrative decisions. In Alder-
man v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), for example, the government as-
serted it could not reveal certain documents relating to the preparation of a de-
fendant's case and evidence of government wrongdoing. The Court simply gave
the government a choice: disclose or dismiss. See also United States v. Sisson,
294 F. Supp. 511 (D. Mass. 1968), appeal denied 399 U.S. 267 (1970); Tigar,
supra note 21, at 1175-78.
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B. The Doctrine of Committed-to-Agency-Discretion
Much of the sovereignty or expediency rationale for avoid-
ing political questions can be seen in the grounds which the United
States federal courts have chosen to deny or severely restrict re-
view of certain kinds of executive or administrative decisions.
The doctrine of "committed-to-agency-discretion" is yet another
dimension of the courts' deferral-some say surrender-to the
dominant political alliance on selected issues. Committed-to-
agency-discretion is, like political questions, a doctrine of non-
reviewability, but differing from it in three important respects.
First, as the name implies, committed-to-agency-discretion spe-
cifically refers to the discretion accorded to federal administrative
agencies, and not the acts per se of the President, Congress, or
other elective offices. Second, its origins and main authority are
derived from statutes, primarily section 10 of the Administrative
Procedures Act rather than federal case law.98 The judiciary
does, of course, have a large hand in determining the extent to
which review is proper on the basis of other statutes. 99
Third, the doctrine does yield to certain nonfrivolous consti-
tutional claims. These may include an absence of due process
or "contentions that the administrator acted beyond his jurisdiction
or in violation of a clear statutory duty."'100 Rules like "substan-
tial evidence," however, have permitted the federal courts to give
wide birth indeed to administrative findings of fact. 101 "Abuse
of discretion," in fact, is a spindly argument for a litigant ag-
grieved by federal administrative action.102 Thus, when a court
invokes committed-to-agency-discretion, it unequivocally "expresses
a general presumption against review. "13
98. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (supp. II, 1967) states:
This chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the
extent that- (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action
is committed to agency discretion by law.
99. It is common for courts to join doctrines of common-law standing
(referring to ripeness, adverseness, substantial personal injury, etc.) with com-
mitted-to-agency-discretion. See, e.g., Gregory Electric Co. v. United States
Dep't of Labor, 268 F. Supp. 987 (D.S.C. 1967); see also Saferstein, Non-
Reviewability: A Functional Analysis of Committed-to-Agency-Discretion, 82
HARv. L. REV. 367, 377-79 (1968).
100. Saferstein, supra note 99, at 370.
101. For a discussion of the substantial evidence rule, see M. SHAPIRO, THE
SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 130 (1968).
102. Id. at 136, 239, et. seq.; NLRB v. Remington Rand Corp., 94 F.2d 862
(1938).
103. Saferstein, supra note 99, at 370. The author points out that under the
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It has been suggested that eight major factors have influ-
enced federal judges to find that certain disputes are committed-
to-agency discretion. 0 4  These are: statutory granting of broad
agency discretion; 105 expertise and experience required to under-
stand subject matter of agency action; 10 the "managerial" nature
of the agency being challenged;10 7 impropriety of judicial inter-
vention in the mandated policy-making functions of elective offi-
cials;' 08 necessity in certain cases of informal agency decision-
making;0 9 inability of reviewing court to ensure the correct result
in highly complex or technical questions;110 the need for expedi-
tious operationalizing of Congressional programs already under
way;" ' and, finally, the existence of other methods for preventing
abuses of discretion." 2 One of these factors by itself rarely is
controlling; rather, it is "their cumulative effect on the interests of
the individual, the agency, and the courts [which] determines
doctrine judges not only abstain from reviewing the substance of the administra-
tive decision but the procedures for deciding as well:
[Elven when the claimant alleges unfairness in a particular aspect
[of the agency determination], it is usually unwise for the court to
consider this claim as distinct from an attack on the merits when con-
ducting the threshold inquiry into reviewability. Issues which seem-
ingly are separable and nondiscretionary such as fact-finding or proced-
ure, themselves often shape the ultimate discretionary determination.
Id. at 368.
104. Id. at 380-95.
105. Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666 (1960), rejecting even partial review
of Director of Alien Property Office's determination that petitioner was ineligi-
ble for return of certain kinds of property.
106. See, e.g., Note, Dismissal of Federal Employees-the Emerging Judicial
Role, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 719, 732 (1966), regarding government personnel ac-
tion as non-reviewable because of the need to recognize "the difficulty of judi-
cially proving the intangibles inherent in an evaluation of on-the-job perform-
ance."
107. Community National Bank v. Gidney, 310 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1962),
denial of review of Comptroller's decision certifying a particular branch bank.
108. Chicago & Southern Airlines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103
(1948).
109. Oscar Mayer Co. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 977 (W.D. Wis.
1967), refusing to hear reasons for vacating rate suspension, done without hear-
ings.
110. See, e.g., Safterstein, supra note 99, at 390, noting that, on remand,
agency may reach the same result using different grounds to which the reviewing
judge is unable to respond or decide the same way with apparent redetermination
of the issue, but in reality not re-thinking the problem at all.
111. Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D. N.Y. 1967),
denying temporary injunction against a federal interstate highway already under
construction.
112. Hamel v. Nelson, 226 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Cal. 1963), complaint non-
reviewable because intra-agency appeal still pending.
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whether review should be denied." 113  As they would interact
with each other, the factors are thus credited with explanatory
power similar to Professor Sharpf's functional criteria regarding
political question cases in the foreign-relations area. Such factors
enable the federal courts to side-step possible damage to the "effi-
cient" and "creative" use of limited agency resources in the face
of those agencies' highly complicated daily workloads, to say
nothing of enabling the courts themselves to conserve their re-
sources. 11
4
One wonders whether this kind of interpretation really stands
up against a thorough analysis of these factors, taken singly or
collectively, and their supporting cases." 3  The weaknesses ap-
parent from an application of Professor Sharpfs functionalism or
Justice Brennan's analytical threads are instructive here. Surely,
an expediency-oriented theory of judicial motivation might better
explain a court's decision to commit some particularly sensitive
case to agency discretion rather than to substantiate non-re-
viewability on the grounds that the case involves "determinations
that lie outside sound judicial domain in terms of aptitude, facili-
ties, and responsibility."" 6  Thus, ambiguous labels like "exper-
tise and experience required to understand subject matter" and
"managerial nature of the agency," are lawyers' euphemisms ob-
scuring the practical or political circumstances of the decision.
The only two criteria of any analytical rigor are "necessity for in-
formal decision-making" and "existence of other methods of pre-
venting abuses of discretion." The latter, however, is a restate-
ment of the rule that administrative remedies must be exhausted
rather than any air-tight indicator of non-reviewability. The ex-
haustion rule, of course, does not intrinsically prevent the litigant
from returning to the same court with the same issue once he has
fully exploited his ordinary opportunities for redress.
11
The United States federal courts have been heavily criticized
113. Saferstein, supra note 99, at 379.
114. Id. at 371.
115. See cases cited notes 105-12 supra.
116. See Curran v. Laird, 420 F.2d 122, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The circuit
court concluded that the administrative decisions were "inextricably intertwined
with and permeated by assumptions and conclusions of national defense strategy."
Id. at 131.
117. See Comment, Administrative Procedures Act, 10(c), 5 U.S.C. § 701
(1971); The Timing of ludicial Review under the Administrative Act, 56
CALIF. L. REv. 1491, 1502-13 (1968).
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for avoiding or severely restricting judicial review of administra-
tive decisions in at least four issue areas involving to a greater or
lesser degree the President's war or national security powers.'"
Specifically, the issue areas include: (1) alien deportation and ex-
clusion proceedings,119 (2) military courts-martial generally, re-
gardless of the issues raised, 120 (3) draft board denials of claims
by conscientious objectors and other draft-resisters prior to induc-
tion or criminal prosecution,' and (4) denials of objections to
the legality or constitutionality of United States military actions
in Vietnam.' In each of these areas, the Court and other fed-
eral tribunals have declined to intervene citing one or more of the
various functional criteria supporting committed-to-agency-discre-
tion. A careful reading of such cases, however, tempts one to ex-
plain the avoidances in terms of the courts' ultimate concern for
questions of national sovereignty in a foreign-relations context and
the probability of more "self-inflicted wounds" if they decide the
issues on their merits. Illustrating this point is one of the cases
which is conducive to explanation under either of the United
States non-reviewability rationales. In Mora v. McNamara
12 3
the Supreme Court denied certiorari to a draft-resister whose chal-
lenges of the Vietnam intervention and the Defense Secretary's dis-
cretionary power to conscript for that conflict were dismissed by
the lower courts.12 4  One commentator highlighted the political
118. Other areas of non or limited reviewability, not related to national
security or foreign policy, have been criticized as well; e.g., (1) actions of Fed-
eral Parole Boards, (2) discretion of United States Attorneys and independent
regulatory agencies as prosecutors, and (3) the Secretary of Labor's extensive
authority over minimum wage requirements of government contractors. See
K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 132-33, 208-11, 177-79 (1969).
119. See text with notes 58-59, 83-87 supra; text and notes 250-55 infra.
120. See text with notes 227-32 infra.
121. Generally, a draft resister can only challenge his induction order after
being inducted or in a criminal proceeding after indictment. See White, Con-
scientious Objector Claims: A Constitutional inquiry, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 625,
657-58 (1968). On the other hand, the Supreme Court has recently allowed pre-
induction lawsuits "where the Court is not asked to challenge the draft boards'
interpretations of the facts." Osterech v. Selective Service, 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
Similarly, it will review where the board has "lawlessly" changed the classifica-
tions of war protesters. Breen v. Selective Service, 396 U.S. 460 (1970). See
also McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969), permitting pre-induction re-
view without exhaustion of administrative remedies where the issue is solely one
of statutory interpretation.
122. See text and notes 94-99 supra, and notes 130-32 with accompanying
text infra.
123. 389 U.S. 934 (1967).
124. Id.
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or expediency reasons for the Court's committing this case to
agency discretion; the functional convergence with political ques-
tions is clear:
Even if the Justices privately thought that the President ex-
ceeded his constitutional authority in sending Mr. Mora to
fight in Vietnam, it would not so declare and presume to re-
strain the President. Nor would the Court adjudicate claims
that acts of the political branches violate international law.
If it heard the case, the Court would have to decide that the
issues are "political questions" and not justiciable; or, that
even if the war is illegal, Mora is not justified thereby in re-
fusing to serve and therefore the legality of the war is not
properly in issue; or that the war is not in fact illegal. 125
III. MEXICAN POLITICAL QUESTIONS: COMPARISONS
WITH JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN THE UNITED STATES
The Mexican version of political questions shares with its
United States counterpart the attribute of permanent attachment
to the issue itself. It differs, however, from Anglo-American
doctrines of non-reviewability in four important respects: (1) it
is specified in the Constitution and federal statute, although the
federal courts have alternatively expanded and restricted its scope
in case law; (2) it is generally confined to the single, "Constitu-
tional Writ," the amparo; (3) it covers subject matter which
differs in most instances from the categories to which doctrines of
political questions and committed-to-agency-discretion apply in
the United States; and (4) a wider and more discernible variety
of cases are immune from judicial review; that is, the scope of
the Mexican doctrine is broader and not as susceptible to excep-
tions when petitioners assert constitutional rights.
Mexico's political questions and judicial limits stem from the
nation's European civil law tradition, 26 the historical concentra-
tion of power in the National Executive and Government (even
while giving lip service to the constitutional principles of feder-
125. Henkin, On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 90-91 (1968).
126. Consider R. BAKER, supra note 5, at 271:
In a . . . general sense, the Supreme Court's willingness to decide con-
stitutional questions of broad policy significance is restricted by the
civil law tradition within which it operates. The strict distinction
between legislative and judicial functions postulated by the civil law
necessarily entails a conception of the judicial role that would exclude
decisions of a manifestly legislative character.
See also J. MERRYMAN, Tm CIVIL LAw TRADTION: INTRODUCTION TO THE
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERIcA 140-48 (1969). •
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alism and separation of powers), and, most importantly, the ide-
ology and political interests thrust up by the cataclysmic Revolu-
tion of 1910-1920. Prior to the Revolution, the long "forced
peace" of Dictator Porfirio Diaz had stabilized social, economic,
and legal institutions. Great strides were made toward systema-
tizing the laws of amparo, civil procedure, criminal justice, and
aliens' rights. 2 7  But for thirty-four years it also was a time
wherein the courts favored the political allies and hacks of the
ancien regime: the large landowners, wealthy businessmen, for-
eign investors, military elites, Church hierarchy, and local jefes
politicos. Closest to the Dictator toward the end were the en-
gineers and apostles of Positivism, the French-speaking and In-
dian-despising cientificos (scientists). 28 Put simply, all those
who benefited from the era's disproportionate and superficial
prosperity also benefited inordinately from the operation of the
law.
It comes as no surprise, therefore, to find the tumulto of the
Revolution giving rise to a powerful legal philosophy of its own:
that the federal courts and Law of Amparo had failed the vast ma-
jority of Mexicans on two broad counts. First, most laws had not
been geared to the problems of the disadvantaged and dispos-
sessed Indians, mestizos, small private and communal (ejido)
farmers, urban laborers, and other "common people."'1 29  Second,
the laws which were relevant, such as those governing criminal
proceedings, were enforced against these disadvantaged classes. 3 '
Thus the writers of the revolutionary Constitution of 1917 sought
to extend the amparo's protective shield around the emerging rev-
olutionary constituency. At the same time, they took steps to re-
strict the judicial access of those profiting from the old order.
The result of these efforts is the Mexican equivalent of the doctrine
of political questions. This section will focus on five of these
127. See Cosio-Villegas, The Porfiriato: Legend and Reality, in HISTORY OF
LATIN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION II 295-300 (L. Hanke ed. 1967); in regard to
the evolution of the amparo during this "formative half-century," see I. BURGOA,
supra note 5, at 123-28; H. Fix ZAMUDiO, EL JuICIO DE AMPARO 232-41, 277
(1964); N.R. MUNoz VASQUEZ, EVOLUCION DEL JUICIO DE AMPARO DESDE EL
PUNTO DE VISTA DE Sus LEYES REGLAMENTARIAS 95 et seq. (UNAM Law Thesis,
1963).
128. Cosfo-Villegas, supra note 127, at 298; C. CUMBERLAND, MEXICO:
STRUGGLE FOR MODERNITY ch. 8 (1968).
129. See C. CUMBELAND, supra note 128, ch. 8; PmuS, A HISTORY OF
MExICO 285-310 (1938).
130. See MUNoz VASQuEZ, supra note 127, at 176-79, 182-83.
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issue-areas which are insulated from direct judicial review in Mex-
ico: free exercise of religion, electoral malfeasance and dismis-
sals of government employees and legislators, expulsion of aliens
by Presidential order, decisions of most "decentralized" adminis-
trative agencies, and the rights of private landowners against
agrarian reform policies.' 31
Revolutionary reaction against the Church and its excessive,
inequitable control of public education and land under Diaz pro-
duced one of the first political question obstacles to the jurisdic-
tion of amparo courts. Article 3 (II) of the Constitution flatly
states:
Private persons may engage in education of all kinds and
grades. But as regards elementary secondary, and normal
education (and that of any kind or grade designed for la-
borers and farm workers), they must previously obtain, in
every case, the express authorization of the public power.
Such authorization may be refused or revoked by decisions
against which there can be no judicial proceedings or re-
course. (emphasis added)
Although this provision relates solely to denying the Church con-
trol over education, it and other considerations have apparently
led to a policy of non-reviewability of almost all issues arising from
disestablishment and state efforts to curtail freedom of religious
expression. The Mexican constitutional equivalent to the United
States free exercise of religion clause actually encourages such ju-
dicial abstinence by its equivocal phrasing:
Everyone is free to embrace the religion of his choice and to
practice all ceremonies, devotions, or observances of his re-
spective faith, either in places of public worship or at home,
provided they do not constitute an offense punishable by law.
Every religious act of public worship must be performed
strictly inside places of public worship, which shall at all
times be under governmental supervision.'3 2
131. Commentaries reviewed on the Mexican counterpart to the United
States political questions doctrine included: I. BURGOA, supra note 5, at 450-53;
I. BURGOA, EL JuICIO DE AMPARO EN MATERFA AGIA 76 et. seq. (1964);
R. BAKER, supra note 5, at ch. 5; 0. A. HERNANDEZ, CURSO DE AMPARO: INSTI-
TUCIONEs FUNDAMENTALES 162-63 et seq. (1966); Alcali-Zamora y Castilo, Ju-
dicial Protection of the Individual against the Executive in Mexico, in JUDICIAL
PROTE TON AGAINST THE ExEcuTIVE 771-79 (Max-Planck-Institut fur Ausland-
isches Offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht 1970); Fix Zamudio, Judicial Protec-
tion against the Executive in Mexico, in id. at 713-70.
132. MEXICO CONST. art. 24.
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Article 130 of the Constitution similarly qualifies its substantive
declaration that, "Congress cannot enact laws establishing or pro-
hibiting any religion," with:
The federal powers shall exercise the supervision required
by law in related matters relating to religious worship and
outward ecclesiastical forms. Other authorities shall act as
auxiliaries of the Federation.
The article then enumerates a host of restrictions on all denomi-
national ministers, churches as social and property-holding insti-
tutions, "periodical publications of a religious character," and re-
ligious-oriented political parties. 3 '
Because of these substantive constitutional restrictions and the
attendant political climate, the Mexican federal courts have avoided
adjudicating challenges to official suppression of religious expres-
sion-a self-imposed, blanket reinforcement of political questions
which is not so apparent in other issue-areas constitutionally or
statutorily limiting judicial review. A detailed examination of the
Compilaci6n de jurisprudencia de la Suprema Corte for 1917-
1965,"1 the annual Informe of the President of the High Court for
1967-1971,1"' and cases reported individually in the Semanario
Judicial de la Federaci6n"a for a thirty-three month period during
1964-1968 reveals no instance where the Court ruled on the merits
of a civil, criminal, or administrative action involving government
favoritism or discrimination against a particular religion. This
conspicuous absence is all the more remarkable considering the
great religious violence sparked by the so-called Cristero Rebellion
in 1926. Its turbulent aftermath extended into the early
1940's.' 3 7  The solution to the crisis was indeed political, involv-
133. Id. art. 130.
134. Formally compiled in ten volumes as an appendix to the record of the
Mexican Court, the summary of precedent is entitled JURISPRUDENCIA DE LA
SUPREMA CORTE DE JUSTICIA DE LOS FALLOS PRONUNCIADOS EN LOS ANOS DE
1917 A 1965 (1965) (hereinafter cited as JURISPRUDENCIA).
135. INFORME RENDIDO A LA SUPREMA CORTE DE LA NACION POR SU PRESI-
DENTE .... (hereinafter cited as INFORME. . . (year): - SALA).
136. The SEMANARIO JUDICIAL DE LA FEDERACION is the monthly record of
Supreme Court "theses" or decisions (hereinafter cited as S.J.F.).
137. This was a violent civil conflict between those backing the Govern-
ment's anti-clerical actions and those, often led by priests, resisting such policies.
Beginning with a crackdown on open religious activities, foreign priests, and
Catholic schools, the strife was only partially abated with the arbitration of U.S.
Ambassador Dwight Morrow in 1928. Violence and political protest continued
until 1941. See C. CUMBERLAND, supra note 128, at 278-90.
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ing police power and negotiation among contending political lead-
ers138 but not judicial rule-making, adjudication, or the writ of
amparo.139
In the United States, on the other hand, Supreme Court in-
terpretations of the first amendment's establishment and free ex-
ercise clauses have a long if sometimes glacial history. But
whether the Court upheld state and federal governmental limits
on free exercise or struck down violations of the establishment
clause, it has in fact ruled on the merits of the claims presented.
It is difficult to imagine a Mexican amparo court reacting as the
United States Court did in West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette by invalidating in time of declared war, no less, state
action compelling school children to salute the Flag on pain of ex-
pulsion from school. 140 Other dramatic examples abound: up-
holding the claims of military conscripts to conscientious-objector
status on the ground of unorthodox as well as orthodox "religious"
beliefs in pacificism if certain conditions are met; 141 denial of a
school board's contention that its mandated prayer reflected the
desire of the parental majority for "free exercise of religion" while
declaring the official prayer violative of the establishment
clause; 142 and insisting that parents have a first amendment right
to send their children to religious schools.' 41 In contrast, the Court
has held that neither "released time" for religious teaching of public
school students, nor free public transportation for parochial stu-
dents provided "for the benefit of the child," breached the separa-
tion of church and state principle. 44 An objection on religious
138. Id. at 285, 291.
139. Minister Mariano Azuela of the Mexican Supreme Court declared that
the prohibition on judicial review regarding government restrictions on parochial
school programs "was in fact a dictatorial imposition," threatening the constitu-
tional right to "freedom of education." In Mexico, he said,
it was impossible to set up a school without official permission, which
was granted at the whim of the authorities; any such school was tied to
the official programmes laid down by the government, which reserved
the right to close the school down, and there was no action for am-
paro [possible] to prevent it from doing so.
Seminar on Amparo, Habeas Corpus, and other Similar Remedies 51 (Conference
at Mexico, D.F., 1961).
140. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
141. Welch v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163 (1965).
142. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); see also Abington Township v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
143. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
144. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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grounds has been declared an acceptable "nexus" of personal in-
terest sufficient for standing to challenge federal spending pro-
grams in the courts. 4 5 Even more recently the Court has upheld
on the merits most of the 1963 federal educational assistance act
pertaining to the church-related recipient colleges.' 46
A second departure from the United States political question
is the Mexican constitutional definition of "strictly political-elec-
toral matters" as non-reviewable issues. Specifically, amparo suits
cannot be brought against electoral commissions, members of such
commissions, or faulty voting tabulations. 14  The Law of Am-
paro also prohibits judicial scrutiny of any legislative action in the
"election, suspension, or removal of functionaries" where the ap-
propriate state or Federal constitutions expressly confer such dis-
cretion on the legislatures. 48 A rationale behind both of these re-
strictions is the concern for governmental sovereignty similar to
what Martin Shapiro has seen in United States political question
cases.' 4 9 Considering well-established precedent of the Mexican
Supreme Court, Professor Ignacio Burgoa reasons that the Mexi-
can federal courts do not decide challenges of the "political-elec-
toral process" because "the writ of amparo is ineffective in deter-
mining whether the origins of [constitutional] authorities are ille-
gitimate or incompetent."'
50
The Mexican Court has similarly ignored its authority to in-
tervene in the nation's electoral processes under article 97 of the
Constitution which provides for a special proceeding whereby the
Court may "investigate the conduct of any federal judge or magis-
trate, or any act or acts constituting violations of any individual
guarantee, or the violation of a public election, or some other
crime punishable by federal law."' ' It has been postulated that
the Court's infrequent and unsuccessful attempts in this area re-
sult primarily from the political pressures exerted by the dominant
political party in Mexico, the Party of Revolutionary Institutions
(PRI), and the President.' 52 The Supreme Court has never ini-
tiated its own investigation of electoral mishaps nor acceded to
145. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
146. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
147. See LAW OF AMPARO art. 73 (VII).
148. Id. art. 73 (VIII).
149. See text with notes 42-47 supra.
150. I. BURGOA, supra note 5, at 452.
151. MEXICO CONST. art. 97 para. 3.
152. R. Sco,-r, MEXICAN GOVERNMENT IN TRANSITION 270-71 (2d ed. 1964).
1973
32
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2 [1973], Art. 19
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol3/iss2/19
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
petitions by state officials to do so, on the ground that such action
would impede state sovereignty. 153  Petitions from voters and op-
position political parties are given even shorter shrift; and these,
says Professor Robert Scott, "come as a matter of course after
every election now that the revolutionary party [the PRI] has be-
come all-powerful."'1 54  Recent cases of such judicial abstention
have been critically reported. 155
After 1962 and Baker v. Carr,5 " little similarity remains be-
tween the United States and Mexico on political questions on the
question of official discretion in the management of elections. To
be sure, the Mexican Supreme Court has left the door open to re-
lief for those claiming deprivations of "political rights"-as long
as petitioners can show that such deprivations involve
the violations of individual guarantees, a fact that cannot be
judged a priori. [When this complaint is made], the amparo
relating to it must be admitted and transmitted in order to
establish, in a final judgement, the validity of the main con-
tentions. 157
Professor Burgoa takes the Court's exception of "individual guar-
antees" to mean rights such as public hearings, "legality" of pro-
cedure, and properly authorized searches and seizures. 58 He cites
no cases supporting these exceptions, however, and the records of
the Supreme Court disclose only one classification so exempted:
where the plaintiffs, as public "administrative" employees, were
arbitrarily dismissed or denied their salaries. 59
153. id. at 270. See also the central Supreme Court ruling in this area,
Varios del Comitg Nacional Directive del PAN, 93 S.J.F. 6a 9poca 60, primera
parte (Plenary) (1946, rept'd March, 1965). In that case, decided coincidentally
in the same year as the leading United States political question case involving
electoral reapportionment (Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549), the Court gave
several reasons for not investigating election misdeeds as petitioned to do so by
PAN, the principal opposition party in Mexico. Inter alia, the Court held it
could only investigate such allegations "to maintain the peace of the nation."
Irreparable injury to private parties was no ground for judicial intervention "be-
cause the laws establish other organs and ordinary recourses to resolve such
problems."
154. R. ScoTr, supra note 152, at 271.
155. See K. JOHNSON, MEXICAN DEMOCRACY: A CRITICAL VIEW 131-32
(1971).
156. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
157. CoMPILACI6N DE LA JURISPRUDENCIA DE LA SUPREMA CORTE DE JUSTICIA,
1917-1965 (hereinafter cited as COMPILACI6N . . . . ), 6a parte, Material General:
Thesis 90, at 164.
158. I. BURGOA, supra note 5, at 451-53.
159. CoMPnLc6N ..... .supra note 57, Thesis 89, at 163. See also R.
BAKER, supra note 5, at 161-62.
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It is difficult indeed to visualize the Mexican Court validat-
ing, as did the United States Court, causes of action against election
officials who "willfully alter and falsely count and certify ballots
of voters."' 60  Also in contrast to this Mexican political question,
the United States Court has enjoined state efforts to exclude Ne-
gro voters from primary elections through regulating political par-
ties.' 6 ' It has outlawed, on fifteenth amendment grounds, a
state policy which eliminated a city's Negro voters as participants
in city elections.' 62 It has ordered state legislatures to reappor-
tion not only lower houses but upper houses on the basis of equal
population districts, 63 and has applied the same standard to Con-
gress" and local governing bodies. 165 Finally, in Powell v. Mc-
Cormack, 66 the justices held that Congress had no vested con-
stitutional authority to expel one of its members by simple majority
vote and thus deny voters of that member's district the product
of their free electoral choice. Here is a direct challenge of the
power of the federal legislature to determine, in the words of the
Mexican amparo prohibition, "the election, suspension, or removal
of functionaries.'
167
Article 33 of the Mexican Constitution protects a third kind
of official action from judicial review.
[Foreigners] are entitled to the guarantees granted by the
[first twenty-nine articles of the] present Constitution; but
the Federal Executive shall have the exclusive power to com-
pel any foreigner whose remaining he may deem inexpedient
to abandon the national territory immediately and without
the necessity of previous legal action. (emphasis added)
The Mexican President's power of expulsion is one of the few excep-
tions to the rule that aliens' rights are equal to those of citizens, 6 '
160. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
161. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
162. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
163. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964); but see Mahan v. Howell, 93 S. Ct. 979 (1973).
164. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
165. See, e.g., Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970);
Avery v. Midland County, Texas, 390 U.S. 474 (1969); Sailors v. Board of Edu-
cation, 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
166. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
167. See text and note 148 supra.
168. Thus the broad procedural protections of articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution are ordinarily available to aliens as well as citizens, particularly the
guarantee of a "legal hearing." See supra note 5, and Schwarz, supra note 5, at
338 n.37, for a brief analysis of those two constitutional articles.
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and the only exception to the general bar against arbitrary depor-
tations and banishments provided by article 22 of the Law of Am-
paro. 169 Nonetheless, the President's authority in this respect ap-
pears absolute in the absence of any Supreme Court decision to the
contrary. 170  Such sweeping discretion in the hands of an already
powerful Executive has been heavily criticized in Mexico as de-
terring freedom of dissent and other exercises of constitutional lib-
erties. 171  Judicial detachment from abuses of Presidential discre-
tion under article 33 is manifestly similar to the United States
Supreme Court's attitude toward deportations and exclusions of
so-called "enemy" and other non-resident aliens under the various
national security and immigration acts. 72  But most aliens sub-
ject to deportation in the United States can obtain declaratory
judgment, habeas corpus, or injunctive relief from most arbitrary
denials of procedural fairness by the administrative authorities.
78
There is no equivalent provision in the United States to the broad
expulsion power granted to the Mexican President.
74
Comparable in some ways to the committed-to-agency-dis-
cretion doctrine in the United States, Mexican federal courts gen-
169. See LAw OF AMPARO art. 22 (II), and text with notes 252-53 infra.
170. See R. BAKER, supra note 5, at 139; Fix Zamudio, supra note 131, at
724.
171. See Alcal-Zamora y Castillo, supra note 131, at 777 n.15. A dozen
Mexican attorneys, about a third of those interviewed for their reaction in
1968, regarded this grant of discretion to an already powerful chief executive as
anomalous in a country prizing the rights of the individual. Others, however,
argued that article 33 would be used, if at all, to oust foreign "agitators" threat-
ening national security in some direct fashion-with Fidel Castro's Cuba the most
frequently mentioned target of the President's wrath. But in August of 1972
United States Professor Kenneth Johnson cited supra note 155, was "quietly
hustled out of the country" after being held incommunicado for 48 hours. Dr.
Johnson's offense was to have written the aforementioned book critical of the
PRI monopoly and on the trip to Mexico in question to have been seen openly
with leaders of PAN, the opposition party. See Los Angeles Times, August 29,
1972, § II, at 10, col. 1.
172. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) and Harisiades v. Shaugh-
nessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952), regarding summary deportation of resident aliens;
Shaughnessy v. United States ex. rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), affirming a
dubiously grounded exclusion of an alien for security reasons without full dis-
closure of reasons to excluded resident; Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763,
775 (1950), upholding "summary arrest, internment, and deportation", during
declared war, of resident enemy aliens; and Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160
(1948), deportations of "alien enemies" held non-reviewable. See also R. SOKOL,
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 57-62 (2d ed. 1969).
173. See text with notes 246-49 in! ra.
174. See R. SOKOL, supra note 172, at 60-61; Developments in the Law-
Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1239-40 n.213 (1970).
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erally must treat "decentralized public organizations" (organis-
mos decentralizados) as private parties and therefore immune to
direct amparo attack. 175  The core reason for such status is that
these agencies, most notably the National University of Mexico and
the Institute of Social Security in its capacity as dispenser of insur-
ance benefits, function not as authoritative, "coercive" institutions
but as based on cooperative, voluntary memberships peculiar to
their "autonomous" roles. In the case of the University, this would
apply to such internal relationships as those between the faculty
and students and in such external relationships as between the
campus and community.1 76  The federal courts have been chas-
tised by those who see this judicially-created variety of committed-
to-agency-discretion as leaving students, faculty, and administra-
tive employees of the University without any legal recourse in the
event of conflict with the Administration.
1 77
The reasons for judicial abstention in this area might be
roughly similar to two grounds for committed-to-agency-discretion
in the United States: "the necessity of informal decision-making"
and the lack of expertise and experience of the courts in weighing
"the intangibles inherent in the evaluation of on-the-job perform-
ance."' 7 But the Mexican doctrine of "private parties" applied
to such agencies to leave them immune from constitutional-rights
litigation has no counterpart in the constitutional or administrative
law of the United States. The only conceivable similarity might
be where, under such liability statutes as the Federal Tort Claims
Act, damages are not recoverable against state and federal gov-
175. I. BURGOA supra note 5, at 206-14; Fix Zamudio, supra note 131, at
721-22. This does not mean, of course, that actions of all such agencies are
forever beyond amparo review. The Administrative Chamber of the Court or
the federal circuit courts may review final judgments of the Federal Fiscal
Tribunal which has appellate "cassation" jurisdiction over autonomous fiscal
agencies like the Institute of Social Security when it assesses quotas for payment
by employers and employees. ORGANIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL FISCAL TRIBUNAL
art. 22 (I). Labor disputes in the same Institute and other decentralized agen-
cies similarly may be appealed to the Federal Boards of Conciliation and Arbi-
tration, and then, via the "direct amparo," to the Labor Chamber or the Supreme
Court or a circuit court. See generally LAW OF AMPARO art. 158 regarding the
direct amparo jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. In that article, the Fiscal
Tribunal and labor boards are considered as administrative courts, and thus
subject to the same procedural and substantive requirements as regular state and
federal courts.
176. I. BURGoA, supra note 5, at 210-14; Alcal-Zamora y Castillo, supra
note 131, at 777 n.16.
177. Alcali-Zamora y Castillo, supra note 131, at 777.
178. See text with notes 106, 109 supra.
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ernments if the injury resulted from the "discretionary" or inten-
tional, vis-d-vis "ministerial" or negligent, action of a particular of-
ficial.'79 Such exceptions to liability may lie even where the state
or federal legislature has waived its "sovereign immunity" from
suit. I" ° Thus, whether or not immunity is waived, usually it is
only the offending officer or officers who can be sued, in effect,
as "private" respondents or defendants in tort."8"
The final political question for Mexican amparo courts is the
apparently unequivocal constitutional denial of standing for pri-
vate landholders to challenge presidential grants (restorations) or
expansions of land and water rights of communal peasant farm-
ers.'8 2 However, the Supreme Court has significantly modified
these restraints and in the process has expanded its own review
power, showing an increasing independence from the dominant
political alliance on a subject of great importance to the revolu-
tionary ideology.
Article 27, the constitutional section on agrarian reform, was
mainly designed to protect the communal farmers of the ejidos and
nacleos de poblaci6n whose land claims often antedated the Span-
ish Conquest. Under the Diaz Dictatorship, these lands had been
confiscated as being held without title and were frequently turned
over to foreigners, native aristocrats, and the Church. 85 After
179. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) and § 1346(b) (1970).
180. Developments in the Law-National Security Interest and Civil Liber-
ties, supra note 11, at 1302 n.78 (1972).
181. But see speculation in Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Con-
stitution as a Sword, 85 HARv. L. Rav. 1532, 1558-59 (1972), on the basis of
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971). In that case, the Supreme Court held that civil damages
for violations of constitutional rights may be brought against federal officers, re-
gardless of a lack of statutory authority to do so. On remand, the circuit court
applied the same recovery rights as upheld earlier under section 1983 (42 U.S.C.
1983), when state officers "under color of state law" violate similar constitu-
tional guarantees, especially those of the Fourth Amendment. See Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). "The Bivens decision leads to the rather striking
conclusion that section 1983 may simply be unnecessary: money damages, as
well as equitable relief, may be obtained in suits founded directly upon the
Constitution." Dellinger, supra, at 1559.
182. MExico CONST. art. 27 (XIV) states:
Landowners affected by decisions granting or restoring communal lands
and waters to villages, or who may be affected by future decisions,
shall have no ordinary legal right or recourse and cannot institute
amparo proceedings. Persons affected by such decisions shall have only
the right to apply to the federal government for payment of the corres-
ponding indemnity.
183. See text and notes 126-30 supra.
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becoming the central concern of the 1910-1920 Revolution, the
communal farmers then became the political base of the Agrarian
Sector of the PRI.'8 4 The restriction on amparo litigation in ar-
ticle 27 (XIV) was enacted as part of this revolutionary pattern.
Because of the need to modernize and increase production in the
agrarian economy, important exceptions to this restriction on am-
paro suits developed. In 1947, President Miguel Aleman forced
Congress into amendment of the Constitution and Agrarian Code
allowing the President to issue "certificates of inaffectability" (cer-
tificados de inafectibilidad) which allowed holders to sue in fed-
eral courts.' 85 Ostensibly, such certificates enabled private farm-
ers who either had been very productive or could be classified as
"small rural proprietors" (pequefias propiedades) ,186 or both, to
enjoin the agriculture ministry from expropriating their lands and
attaching them to existing communal farms. But Mexican Presi-
dents beginning with Aleman were suspected of using the certifi-
cates instead as means for political patronage or delegating exces-
sive authority for such purposes to the Secretariat of Agriculture
and Livestock and the various Agrarian Commissions. 1 7
In the law schools, in the legal commentaries, and among
practicing lawyers, opposition to the conduct of agrarian reform
in Mexico began to focus on two basic points: (1) the procedure
for issuing certificates of inaffectability placed excessive discre-
tionary authority in the hands of the President and his Secretary
of Agriculture, in effect putting both the policy formulation and
the administration of agrarian programs outside the scope of any
judicial-and therefore constitutional-controls; and (2) this
practice effectively denied, as well, the constitutional due process
right of the small rural proprietor to an administrative hearing and
184. See R. SCOTT, supra note 152, at 162-63, 171-72.
185. MEXICO CONST. art. 27 (XIV para. 3).
186. The pequefla propiedad is expressly limited and protected from arbi-
trary expropriation by article 27 (XV) of the Constitution. See text with note
194 inIra.
187. Several lawyers interviewed in Mexico expressed such cynicism. Simi-
larly, grants of pequefia propiedad have been criticized as in reality a reinstate-
ment of latijundismo. According to John Gerassi, the 100-hectare limit set by
the Constitution is a subterfuge because,
100 hectares of irrigated land represent extremely valuable property.
In addition, the latifundistas get around the law by having 100 hectares"owned" by each member of their families. Hundreds of presidential
friends have been given land and, accumulated at 100 hectares per
family member, they have become today's latifundistas.
J. GERASSI, GREAT FEAR IN LATIN AmERICA 105 (2d ed. 1965).
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appeal prior to confiscation, a denial not challengeable through the
indirect administrative amparo.1 8 As the level of criticism of
national agrarian reform policy increased in both frequency and
intensity, the Administrative Chamber of the Court began to re-
spond to its legal "reference groups." Until the mid-1960's, the
Court sitting en banc had refused to review any case wherein
"landowners [were] affected by ownership or restitutory grants of
lands or waters . . .even though substantial violations of proce-
dure are alleged."' 89  The federal courts also denied standing to
litigants challenging laws or actions threatening small agricultural
properties. 190
In 1962, however, the Administrative Chamber laid down
precedent (jurisprudencia) in favor of the non-certificate holding
pequhia propiedad petitioners, culminating a series of similar
holdings which began in 1954.191 It not only granted standing to
188. Burgoa mainly criticizes the "certificating" discretion of the President
as infringing on the constitutional roles of the Federal Judiciary and the amparo.
He also argues that amparo should lie against land distribution affecting the
small rural properties defined in article 27 (XV). But he agrees that in all
other cases Presidential and gubernatorial grants and enlargements of title to
the communal farmers should remain non-reviewable. I. BURGOA, ELJuIcIO DE
AMPARO EN MATERiA AGRARIA, 88-110 (1964). A whole host of law school
theses, reflecting criticism among young lawyers, shared Burgoa's assessment of
the problem. See, e.g., A. GUILBOT SERROS, REINSTITUTION DEL JutcIo DE
AMPARO EN MATERIA AGRARIA (UNAM Law Faculty, 1957). Others stressed the
need for administrative hearings to determine whether applicants for certificates
of inaffectability actually were eligible to receive or renew them, as well as to
ascertain the entitlements of competing ejidatarios and small rural proprietors;
amparo would then be the resort of those denied such procedural equality. See,
e.g., F. DE LA CRuz, NECESIDAD DE REGLAMENTAR EL ULTIMO PARRAFO DE LA
FRACCION 14 DEL ARTICULO 27 CONSTITUCIONAL (UNAM Law Faculty, 1963).
Equal hearing rights for pequeia propiedad holders would seem especially neces-
sary with the special standing and procedural advantages accorded to ejidos and
ntficleos in the 1963 reforms of the amparo law; see LAW OF AMPARO arts. 22
(II), 74, 39, 123; MEXICO CONST. art. 107 (II, VIII, d).
189. COMPILACI6N ...., 3a parte (Administrative): Thesis 21 at 40; Ju-
RISPRUDENCA, Thesis 749, IV, at 1366-67. The series of five cases establishing
the precedent began with that of Talavera Mariano, Sucesi6n de, 74 S.J.F. 5a
6poca 2398 (Oct. 27, 1942).
190. I. BURGOA, supra note 188, at 91.
191. COMPILACI6N . . . . 3a parte (Administrative): Thesis 79 at 95-101.
This is the first thesis attacking "total Presidential discretion" directly on the
matter of small properties and, further, strongly insructing agrarian authorities
on the concrete title rights of such property owners; see discussion with note 194
infra. Earlier decisions of the Administrative Chamber, however, had paved the
way for this result by allowing amparo suits to test the execution of Presidential
decrees affecting non-certificated small properties. COMPmAcI6N ..... 3a
parte (Administrative); Thesis 75, 77, at 91-93, 93-94.
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litigants seeking indirect amparo relief, but upheld on their merits,
trial court decisions in favor of such petitions. Because of the
1958 amendments to the Law of Amparo, 192 the five-man Cham-
ber could not impugn the constitutionality of those state and fed-
eral codes denying the right of hearing and procedural fairness to
the small proprietors. But it could, and on several occasions did,
uphold or ensure "final suspensions" of such confiscatory proceed-
ings until these procedural rights were recognized. 193  The re-
sponsible authorities and third-party comuneros raised the objec-
tion that the small rural proprietors in many cases did not have
title, as granted by the President pursuant to article 27 of the
Constitution, and thus lacked sufficient "legal interest." The
Court ruled that plaintiffs could constitutionally and statutorily
claim ownership based on "positive prescription;" that is, accord-
ing to article 66 of the Agrarian Code, by possessing lands not ex-
ceeding the acreage limits fixed by article 27 (XV) of the Con-
stitution "in public, peaceful, and continuous fashion." Said
possession must also have been prior to the application of the eji-
dos for expansion by at least five years.19 4  Further, article 27
(XV) expressly holds liable "the mixed commissions, local gov-
ernments, and any other authorities charged with agrarian pro-
ceedings" if they make grants which affect "small agricultural or
192. LAW OF AMPARO art. 84 (I,a) and ORGANIc LAW OF THE FEDERAL
JUDIClARY art. 11 (IV bis., a), as amended, provide monopoly jurisdiction for the
whole or Plenary Court over all petitions attacking the inherent constitutionality
of state or federal laws. If the amparo petition includes a "legality" issue with
one of constitutionality, the former is remanded to the Supreme Court chamber
or circuit court for interpretation of the statute or its execution, but only after
the whole Court has ruled on the validity of the law in the abstract. LAw OF
AMPARO, art. 92. One might well see this as a direct effort to limit the growing
independence of the Administrative Chamber. As a partial response to the great
backlog and delays produced by this Plenary Court monopoly, the 1968 reforms
permitted each chamber to apply existing jurisprudence of the Plenary Court to
"amparo against the laws" coming before it.
193. See, e.g., Amparo en revisi6n de Ascensi6n Ramos y coags., 84 S.J.F.
6a 6poca 14, 3a parte (Administrative) (June 17, 1964). There, pequefia
propiedad petitioners sought to prevent the Governor and state agrarian com-
mission from evicting them from lands they had occupied for more than twenty
years. The Federal District Court denied injunctive relief. On appeal, the
Administrative Chamber reversed on the narrower ground that petitioners had
been denied their right to "a hearing for their defense as against the claims of
third parties" (i.e., the neighboring ejido). The Court then remanded to the
lower court, with instructions that the agrarian commission provide the necessary
hearing as to ownership rights--even in the absence of statutory authority to do
So.
194. See CoMPI.ACI6N ... , supra note 191, at Thesis 79.
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livestock properties in operation." In most instances, however,
the Court has left the merits of the ownership claims to the de-
termination of ministerial authorities when the proceedings have
been consistent with constitutional due process.195
The jurisprudencia of the Court on this issue reflects a posi-
tion similar to that adopted in response to attacks on the constitu-
tionality of the Vietnam war as pressed by draft-resisters in the
United States: the Supreme Court stops short of making a judg-
ment on the validity of the policy itself, but does intervene to guar-
antee that the full light of an evidentiary hearing will be shed
on such claims, either within the agency's decisional process or in
later judicial proceedings. If the government refuses to permit
such disclosures, its offending action is suspended.' 96
While at least partially satisfying many critics in the legal
profession, the Mexican Court's new position was definitely un-
satisfactory to leaders of the Agrarian Sector in the PRI, some
state governors, and other authorities charged with responsibility
for agrarian reform. As the decisions in favor of the procedural
rights of the pequehia propiedad continued, 197 criticism of the Ad-
ministrative Chamber and the Court generally became more in-
tense and widespread. Newspaper articles criticized the decisions
on four "revolutionary" grounds: 9 ' (1) article 27 (XIV) of the
Constitution expressly forbids such judicial review of Presidential
grants without the aforementioned certificates; (2) the new rul-
ings contradict the Supreme Court's own precedent which since
1942 had mandated denial of standing and any relief in federal
court to small rural proprietors;' 99 (3) the contradictory jurispru-
dencia favorable to the private farmers rests on fragile statutory
support, article 66 of the Agrarian Code, and in fact contravenes the
intent of Congress as expressed in the debates over the Alemgn
195. See, e.g., the Ascensi6n Ramos case, 84 S.J.F. 6a 6poca 14, 3a parte
(Administrative), (June 17, 1964).
196. See comment on Alderman v. United States, note 97 supra.
197. See, e.g., the cases and accompanying arguments in INFORME...
1970: SEGUNDA SALA (Administrative): Theses at 53, 62-67, 76, 85.
198. See Lemus Garcia, El amparo en materia agraria: trabajos presentados
durante del Congreso extraordinario de la Confederaci6n Nacional Campesina,
25 al 28 de agosto de 1967, El Dia (September 7, 1967); Martinez Camberos,
Apuntes para el estudio de un conflicto entre ejecutorias de la Suprema Corte de
Justicia, El Dia (January 29, 1968); Hinojosa Ortiz, Tesis anti-constitucional
antiagrarista de la Suprema Corte de la Naci6n, El Dia (date unknown, 1968).
199. See note 189 supra.
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Reform of 1946, that is, to grant supreme authority over all agrar-
ian reform policy to the President; and (4) the Supreme Court
had caused "great dislocations" in the ejidos while encouraging
abuse "on the part of the large estates [latifundia] whose owners
delay and obstruct administrative proceedings empowered to find
sufficient arable land for the growing ejidatario population.
20 0
The Supreme Court has thus far stood its ground in the face
of such political pressure, 20 1 although it has conceded to the gov-
ernment on marginal issues involving agrarian policy. 20 2 Federal
courts in general have encountered great obstacles in some parts
of the country when it comes to enforcing politically unpopular de-
cisions. The President of the Court frankly complained about
the lack of cooperation from some state governors and military
zone commanders whose help was requested by federal district
judges and the Supreme Court, but who failed to move promptly,
if at all, against invasions by communal farmers onto lands pos-
sessed by small private owners supposedly protected by amparo
injunctions. 20 3  Two district judges interviewed in outlying towns
200. Hinojosa Ortiz, supra note 198. The writer further suggests that the
Supreme Court has become the willing accomplice of the conservative-aristo-
cratic party, the PAN, by its decisions favoring private agriculturalists.
201. See cases and theses cited note 197 supra; INFORME . . . 1971: SE-
GUNDA SALA (Administrative): Theses 14, 16, 21, 25-27, 38, respectively found at
54-55, 59, 64-66, 68-71, 79-80. All cited directly or indirectly refer to the vari-
ous procedural rights of affected small rural landholders and the competency of
the Court to review them.
202. See, e.g., Amparo en revisi6n de Camila Magana Cuevas, 133 S.J.F. 6a
6poca 18, 3a parte (Administrative) (1968), denying that the legal office of the
federal agriculture ministry had the character of "responsible authority" and
thus his "investigative" functions were not enjoinable under amparo; Amparo en
revisi6n de Villalba Ruiz, 134 S.J.F. 6a 6poca 18, 3a parte (Administrative)
(1968), denying amparo because proprietor failed to demonstrate his physical
working of the land in question; and two cases cited in INFORME . . . 1970: SE-
GUNDA SALA (Administrative), at 71-72, 74, placing formal limits on the kinds of
"proofs" and title claims which can be offered by small private farmers.
203. Interview with Lic. Presidente Agapito Pozo, in Mexico City, August,
1968. Securing executive compliance of final amparo decrees is difficult, both
politically and procedurally. If the responsible authority fails to comply with
final suspension order, devices known as the queja (complaint), used in cases of
excessive or deficient execution, and the incidente de inejecuci6n, for complete
lack of execution, may be employed to order such compliance. LAW OF AM-
PARo arts. 95-97, 105-08. These must be processed through the Plenary Court at
the initiative of the plaintiff (quejoso) favored by the judgment. No federal
district judge is empowered to issue his own contempt or non-compliance citation.
CoMPUAcI6N . . . ., Material General: Thesis 105, at 207. Burgoa strongly
criticizes this restriction, supra note 5, at 547n.
If the offending authority continues to defy the judgment or repeats the
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expressed similar sentiment more intensely. On the other hand,
a number of the Administrative Chamber's own cases indicate
that the Federal Public Minister's Office is cooperating to some
extent by bringing penal actions against responsible authorities
and third-party efidos who fail to carry out amparo judgments.204
IV. MEXICAN JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: COMPARISONS
WITH LIMITED-REVIEWABILITY AREAS IN THE
UNITED STATES
The Mexican Supreme Court's treatment of agrarian amparo
cases, an area supposedly forbidden to judicial scrutiny, illustrates
the increasing independence of the Mexican Federal Judiciary in
deciding constitutional-rights cases on their merits. The amparo
courts have expressed this independence mainly by demanding
that all litigants be accorded a wider degree of procedural fair-
ness in official decisions, whether such decision-makers be munici-
pal officials, federal and state administrators, law enforcement of-
ficers, or judges.20 5
Insistence on proper administrative and judicial procedures
in amparo litigation at times has borne down heavily on official
discretion in politically sensitive areas. These have included state
enjoined acts, at the initiative of the original trial judge or interested parties,
the Plenary Court can order his removal from office and his appearance before a
district judge for appropriate criminal action as brought by the Public Minister.
LAw OF AMPARO art. 108. On conviction, the authority then can receive up to
six years' imprisonment and a 1000-peso fine. Id. art. 199; FEDERAL PENAL
CODE 213. Such convictions are rare.
It should be noted that "there exists no particular statute nor immunity for
public servants in civil conflicts." Mxico CONST. art. 114. Further, the
Supreme Court can demand suspension of immunity if the authority claims "con-
stitutional status" to avoid removal from office. LAw OF AMPARO art. 109.
Many lawyers interviewed in Mexico, however, see the key problem of judicial
enforcement as the lack of cooperation of the Federal Public Minister in bringing
such criminal sanctions against the abusive official. See, e.g., Alcald-Zamora y
Castillo, supra note 131, at 174, who criticizes the exorbitant discretionary pow-
ers of the Public Minister in criminal prosecutions generally.
204. See, e.g., Amparo en revisi6n de Comisariado Ejidal del Poblado
Tumbiscatto. . . 133 S.J.F. 6a 6poca 15, 3a parte (Administrative) (1968).
205. "[In Mexico] the average citizen . . . looks to the courts for technical
interpretations of the law or protection against arbitrary applications by capricious
individuals, and to the presidency when he wishes to influence basic policy."
R. ScoTr, supra note 152, at 272. In light of the actual performance of amparo
courts since 1940, however, this should be amended as follows: ". . . for the
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and federal taxation of income and real property; ° ' military con-
trol over pensions,2 0 7  housing,208  and non-service-connected
crimes by soldiers;200 denials to aliens of professional licenses and
due process in deportation actions; 10 the application of interna-
tional treaties to Mexican citizens;211 and methods of expropri-
ating real property for public purposes, including the aforemen-
212tioned agrarian reform programs.
Four of these issue areas are by contrast either non-review-
able or very narrowly reviewable by United States courts consistent
with such doctrines as political questions, committed-to-agency-
discretion, and deferral to state courts.213 First, Mexican amparo
precedent has long held that federal and state tax laws may be
reviewed as to their substantive constitutionality and procedural
fairness.214 The Mexican judicial position is clear: in all such
cases the amparo petition should be heard; the United States argu-
ment that the plaintiff lacks sufficient "juridical interest" to sue
206. See note 213 and accompanying text infra.
207. See text and notes 235-36 infra.
208. Similar to broad restrictions on military decisions in other administra-
tive areas, the Administrative Chamber has compelled the Directive Committee
on Military Housing to provide equitable remedies and procedures to those
threatened with eviction on military property. See INFORME . . . 1968: SE-
GUNDA SALA (Administrative): Thesis at 24.
209. See text and note 234 in! ra.
210. See notes 237-39, 244, 252-53 and accompanying text infra.
211. See text and notes 258-59.
212. See text with notes 182-204 supra.
213. Deferral is a judicial doctrine limiting federal jurisdiction relative to
matters of state law. Unlike doctrines of non-reviewability, however, deferral to
state courts presupposes the existence of adequate or substantially equivalent
state remedies as available to litigants asserting federal-rights claims. Regarding
federal deferral to state taxation laws or rate-fixing, see supra note 54. Ade-
quacy or equivalency of state remedies are particularly required in federal civil
rights cases. See Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3610(c)-(d) (1970).
See generally, on deferral as opposed to abstention, Schwarz, supra note 5, at
343 n.66.
214. Already noted is the expansion of amparo jurisdiction under the due
process guarantees of constitutional articles 14 and 16, despite the theoretical
line drawn at the first twenty-nine articles of the Constitution specifying indi-
vidual rights. See supra note 5.
Thus far, the jurisdiction conferred by articles 14 and 16 has been used
most frequently to combat violations of section IV, article 31, and . . .
article 73, the latter listing powers delegated to the federal Congress.
Virtually all these cases have been concerned with the validity of tax
measures.
R. BAKER, supra note 5, at 131 n.36; and see, e.g., Cooperativa La Azteca
coags., 79 S.J.F. 6a 6poca 20, la parte (Plenary) (1964).
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the spending agency is invalid.215 The United States federal
courts under Frothingham v. Mellon and other decisions have tra-
ditionally rejected taxpayers' suits against state and federal spend-
ing for wars, religious programs, and welfare policies, 216 on the
ground that such suits touched on the inherent sovereignty or the
very existence of the political system. 17 More recent opinions
have opened the standing door a crack, but only to litigants chal-
lenging federal2 lI and state 219 expenditures financing instruction
in religious schools as violative of the establishment and free ex-
ercise clauses of the first amendment.
The Mexican position favoring taxpayers' suits represents an
interesting contrast to the Frothingham pattern in the United
States, especially since it comes from a judicial system based on
the European civil law principle of "legislative supremacy:"
The Court is within its powers to judge the unconstitution-
ality of fiscal laws, just as it can that of any other law. This
power may be exercised broadly, analyzing if there is insuf-
ficient generality [in the application of the law]; if it con-
tradicts its own principles; if the powers of other authorities
are invaded; if the rights to a hearing for the litigants are
not observed; if the laws are made retroactive; in sum, if the
[fiscal laws] are within the general principles of individual
guarantees [of the Constitution]. 22
0
It would be difficult to find a judicial philosophy closer to Chief
Justice Marshall's classic "It is a Constitution we are expound-
ing," uttered in another famous tax case.22' Perhaps the real rea-
son behind the Mexican Court's marked independence in this
area is the special relationship between the Administrative Cham-
ber and the highly prestigious Federal Fiscal Tribunal.2 2 The
Fiscal Tribunal is similar in function to the United States Tax Court
but possesses broad review powers more like those of the French
215. See the especially activist judicial philosophy advanced by Sr. Ministro
Manuel Yafiez Rufz, El Problema Fiscal y la Supreme Corte de Justicia de la
Naci6n, Octubre de 1970, INFORME. . , 1970: Annex 21, at 329-423.
216. See notes 53-55, and accompanying text supra.
217. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 186 (1904).
218. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), text with note 146 supra;
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), discussed in text with notes 52, 56-57,
145 supra.
219. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
220. Ministro M. Yafiez Ruiz, supra note 215, at 422.
221. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316, 407 (1819).
222. See section V infra.
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administrative tribunal, the Conseil d' Etat. The Mexican Tri-
bunal oversees and screens for "illegality" all actions of the fiscal
agencies of the Federal Government, including those operating
the Federal District.223 It is known for its hard-headed review
of administrative decisions for their substantive conformity with
existing revenue statutes and the due process rights of taxpayers
or other assessed citizens. 224  Thus, by the time the Government's
case has reached the Administrative Chamber on direct appeal, it
has been subjected to thorough and often critical scrutiny by the
Tribunal. One survey revealed that the Chamber upheld the Tri-
bunal against the federal fiscal authority in at least 60 per cent
of the proceedings where the latter had appealed via the special
revisi6n fiscal recourse. 225  This contrasts with greater percentages
of "pro-government" decisions in the Civil, Criminal, and Labor
Chambers of the Court.226
223. As of 1967 congressional reforms, the Federal Fiscal Code and Organic
Law of the Fiscal Tribunal broadly define the term "fiscal" as it relates to the
Tribunal's jurisdiction. It may now hear appeals from fines levied by any federal
agency, competency disputes between treasury departments of the two federal en-
tities, pension administration by the Institute of Social Security and Public
Employees' Services and Secretariat of Defense, enforcement of public works
contracts let by "dependencies of the National Executive Branch," and, most
importantly and most frequently, all tax assessments by the Treasury Secretary
or Treasurer of the Federal District "when the injury is not reparable by any
other administrative recourse." ORGANIC LAW FEDERAL FISCAL TRIBUNAL arts.
22, 23, and 123 (as revised, 1967). See also Carrillo Flores, Origines y desarrollo
del Tribunal Fiscal de la Federaci6n, REVISTA DEL TRIBUNAL FISCAL DE LA
FEDERACION 15, 30 (no. 3 extraordinario, 1967); Fix Zamudio, supra note 131,
at 720, 722, 726-29, et seq.
224. ORGANIC LAW FEDERAL FISCAL TRIBUNAL arts. 228-30 (as revised, 1967).
HERRIMAN & LEE, FINANCING URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN MEXICO 39-47, 57-63
(1967). Reviewing only the legality and procedural sensitivity of fiscal agency
decisions, and nullifying those not in accord with the Federal Fiscal Code,
gives to the Fiscal Tribunal its "cassation" function. Unlike amparo courts, the
Tribunal does not void such acts as unconstitutional nor substitute its own in-
terpretation of the statute in the individual cases brought before it. See, Fix
ZAMUDIO, EL Juicio AMPARO 327-28 (1964); Carillo Flores, supra note 223, at
30-31.
225. Interview with Carlos del Rio Rodriguez, President, Federal Fiscal
Tribunal (now Minister of the Supreme Court), in Mexico City, August, 1968.
A perusal of the few revisi6n fiscal cases fully reported in S.J.F. for the period
of January 1964-June 1966, and June through August, 1968, revealed that the
President's estimate was, if anything, conservative. Of the 35 cases reported,
the Administrative Chamber upheld Tribunal actions against Treasury officials in
30; three resulted in partial rulings for the government appellants, and only two
affirmed the government's arguments against the Tribunal.
226. See tables in section V infra.
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A second area in which Mexican federal courts take an ac-
tivist stand relative to their counterparts in the United States is the
reviewability of military courts-martial and administrative actions.
The United States courts have maintained a highly restrictive at-
titude toward review of military courts-martial and, until recently,
challenges of military jurisdiction over soldiers accused of off-duty
or non-service-connected crimes. Only in O'Callahan v. Parker
did the Supreme Court hold that federal habeas corpus relief was
available to obtain civilian trials for servicemen charged with such
crimes.227 This breakthrough and others228 notwithstanding, what
one specialist held is still essentially true: "The decisions of
courts-martial are not subject to direct review in the federal
courts."'229 Even when ruling on habeas corpus petitions, the
courts have predominately applied the "fair consideration" test to
matters of fact as well as to federal-rights claims.2 30  To the ma-
jority of judges this means simply,
did the military consider the allegation? If so, the military
determination is conclusive . . . . These courts, in other
words, refuse to consider de novo any issue on which the
military has made a decision.
231
Clearly the military courts enjoy much greater deference from the
federal bench in habeas corpus actions than do the more constitu-
tional-rights-oriented state judicial systems.232
227. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
228. See, e.g., Harris v. Cicone, 290 F. Supp. 729, 733 (W.D. Mo. 1968);
White v. Humphrey, 212 F.2d 503 (3d Cir., cert. denied, 348 U.S. 900 (1954).
In both cases, the court reviewed issues of constitutional rights de novo; such
instances are rare indeed.
229. Comment, God, the Army, and Judicial Review: The In-Service Con-
scientious Objector, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 379, 380-81 (1968); and see Sherman,
The Military Courts and Servicemen's First Amendment Rights, 22 HASTINGS L.J.
325, 326 (1971).
230. Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953).
231. Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 174, at
1218.
232. When considering a habeas petition from a state prisoner, the fed-
eral court can inquire de novo into questions of constitutional law and
can repeat the process of applying the law to the facts, no matter how
fully the state court has considered the issue and no matter how ade-
quate the state procedures. If the state inadequately considered issues
of fact, the federal court can redetermine them. But Burns has been
read to prohibit inquiry into law or fact if the military has decided
the issue.
Id. See also Comment, Federal Habeas Corpus-The Underdeveloped Areas,
41 WASH. L. REV. & ST. BAR J. 327, 335 (1966), to wit: "While partaking of due
process, the applicable standard [i.e., "fair consideration"] sounds like review of
an administrative rate-making decision."
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The Mexican Supreme Court review of military courts-mar-
tial via the direct amparo procedure appears to be much broader
as well as more common than in the United States. The issues cog-
nizable by the Court range from whether the military tribunal cor-
rectly interpreted the Code of Military Justice to the accuracy of
findings of fact.2"3 The Plenary Court also has forthrightly de-
nied the military courts jurisdiction in competency disputes with
civilian courts over soldiers charged with off-duty or non-military
crimes.23 4 Finally, the Administrative Chamber of the Court has
been under fire for upholding Fiscal Tribunal rulings against the
Defense Secretariat in favor of revolutionary veterans 25 and un-
married mothers 36 in their claims for military pensions.
Protection and broad reviewability of a variety of aliens'
claims to due process and legal equality by Mexican amparo courts
is a third point of contrast with limited reviewability available in
United States federal tribunals. Especially noteworthy are the suc-
cessive jurisprudencias issued by the Mexican High Court against
the constitutionality of the 1944 federal professional licensing law
and state laws similarly discriminating against resident aliens.23 7
The Court has found that a commercial income tax levied as a
requisite for practicing a "non-commercial profession" was a dou-
233. See, e.g., Amparo directo de Eleuterio de la Cruz, cited as an "im-
portant thesis" in INFORME . . . 1970: PRIMERA SALA (Penal): Thesis at 40.
Here an enlisted man convicted for murdering his superior officer had his
sentence reduced to seven years from death, after a finding of fact that the
crime was provoked by the officer's insults.
234. Compilaci6n .... , supra note 157 primera parte (Plenary): Thesis
36, at 154-55.
235. See CASTELLANOS ALONSO, LA JURISDICCION MILITAR Y EL AMPARO
(SALA MILrrAR EN LA H. SuPREmA CORTE) (UNAM Law Faculty, 1965); the
author sharply criticizes the Court for its anti-military decisions in this area and
proposes a separate Military Chamber.
236. Revisi6n fiscal de Maria Elena Ferndndez R., 133 S.J.F. 6a 6poca, 3a
parte (Administrative) (1968). In a series of jurisprudencias against the Sec-
retariat of Defense, the Court found that those benefiting from favorable amparo
judgments were entitled as well to reinstatement of all salaries and benefits "in
order to restore matters to the state they were prior to the violation of guarantees
which motivated the federal protection." INFORME . . . (1970): SEGUNDA SALA
(Administrative): Theses at 38-43.
237. See amparo en revisi6n, 35 S.J.F. 6a 6poca 141, primera parte (Plenary)
(1960), cited and analyzed in J. L. SIQuIERos & S.A. BAYITCH, CONFLICT OF THE
LAWS: MEXICO AND THE UNITEn STATES 53-57 (1968). See also Amparo en
revisi6n de F. Garcia Calder6n, in INFORME . . . 1970: SEGUNDA SALA (Admin-
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ble, unequal tax compounding that already assessed on the plain-
tiffs income.238 Alien doctors and lawyers have benefited from
amparo judges' "supplying the deficiency of the complaint," in
other words correcting technical errors in their petitions, when
appealing denials of licenses to teach or practice by the Federal
Director-General of Professions.23
In the United States, the Supreme Court has not made clear
whether resident aliens have a uniform federal right to obtain re-
lief under the fourteenth amendment's Equal Protection Clause
against states which discriminate in matters of gaming licenses, pri-
vate property ownership, and free entry into law, medicine, and
other professions. This uncertainty continues in spite of its rul-
ings in Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission24 and Yick Wo
v. Hopkins,241 striking down state denials of commercial licenses
relying principally on the argument that the affected aliens "can-
not live where they cannot work." It is true that state and
federal courts, following Takahashi, have now apparently swung
to the side of equal economic opportunity for aliens,2 42 but con-
fusion nonetheless persists because of the wide variety of state
policies, some highly discriminatory, regarding the employment
and property rights of aliens.24 3  It seems only a comprehensive
Supreme Court opinion will clarify the waters of aliens' economic
rights now muddied by "judicial federalism."
On the matter of arbitrary deportations of resident aliens,
the Mexican Law of Amparo expressly grants standing to chal-
238. Amparo en revisi6n de P. Barrientos Castillo, 132 S.J.F. 6a 6poca 42,
primera parte (Plenary) (1968); see also Amparo en revisi6n de F. A. Ponce A.,
98 S.J.F. 6a 6poca 23, primera parte (Plenary) (1965).
239. Amparo en revisiSn de M. Tulio Castro Guevara, 105 S.J.F. 6a 6poca 41,
primera parte (Plenary) (1966).
240. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
241. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
242. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), invalidating
two states' denial of general assistance to aliens, on equal protection clause
grounds; Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. California, 71 C.2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 77 (1969), voiding Labor Code section prohibiting employment of aliens on
public works; Note, Constitutionality of Restrictions on the Aliens' Right to Work,
57 COLuM. L. REV. 1012 (1957).
243. See Leger v. Sailer, 321 F. Supp. 250, 258-259 (1970); W. LOCKHART,
Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 817-18 (3d
ed. 1970). Regarding the current diversity of state policies toward alien land
ownership, see Comment, Do We Live in Alien Nations?, 3 CALIF. W. INT'L
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lenge all alleged violations of statutory intent by an official's mis-
application of a statute as well as violations of constitutional due
process. Remaining beyond the amparo's grasp, however, is the
often-criticized power of the President to expel those he deems
"inexpedient. ' 244  United States federal case law and statute have
long held deportations and exclusions to be areas involving politi-
cal questions and administrative discretion.2 45  Increasingly, how-
ever, judicial review via habeas corpus has been opened up to as-
certain whether the Immigration and Naturalization Service fol-
lowed minimal standards of due process and substantive correct-
ness in its proceedings. Thus, the prospective deportee is
entitled to at least a fair hearing, prior notice, counsel of his
choice, and, for other than "subversive" or "enemy" aliens, dem-
onstration of "a minimal rational relationship to a proper govern-
mental purpose. ' 248  For "friendly" resident aliens, by far the
most favored class of aliens faced with deportation or exclusion,
24 1
habeas corpus is the common judicial remedy, although the de-
claratory judgment has become a supplemental attack of such
orders.248  A 1961 amendment to the Immigration and National-
ality Act broadened the range of judicial fact-finding from the
old standard of looking for any factual support of the agency
action: the court may now determine "whether the administra-
tive findings are supported by reasonable, substantial, and proba-
tive evidence on the record as a whole." 4 '
244. See discussion in text and notes 168-71 supra. The same article 33 of
the Constitution authorizing such summary power by the President also equates
aliens' rights with those of citizens in "non-political" areas. See R. BAKER, supra
note 5, at 139.
245. See text and notes 82-86 supra. See also Shaughnessy v. United States
ex. rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), establishing exclusion of aliens for national
security reasons as a political question.
246. See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Kwong Hai Chew v.
Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903);
see also Sherman v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 87 S. Ct. 483
(1966), for voiding of a deportation order lacking "clear, unequivocal, and con-
vincing evidence that facts alleged as grounds for deportation are true."
247. See R. SOKOL, supra note 172, at 57-62.
248. 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1964); Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S.
180 (1956).
249. 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(4) (1964). Ostensibly this change applies to ha-
beas review as well and represents an improvement over the old "no basis in fact"
test limiting broad inquiry on behalf of petitioning aliens. Exclusions, how-
ever, appear not to be affected by the 1961 changes. See Developments in the
Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 174, at 1247-48. See also Sherman v.
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Judicial review of any deportation order, however, "is con-
fined to an examination of the administrative record. . . . There-
fore, the court has no authority to conduct a de novo hearing on
the merits exploring the same ground covered in the administra-
tive hearing. '2 50  Thus, even where he asserts constitutional-rights
violations, the resident alien threatened with deportation cannot
expect federal courts to scrutinize facts beyond the record or the
Immigration and Naturalization Service's legal interpretation of
those facts.25' In Mexican cases of irreparable or "imminent"
threats to fundamental rights such as deportation actions, the am-
paro judge may provisionally suspend the offending act without
the necessity of formal briefs or complaint (suspensi6n de ofi-
cio) ;252 he then considers oral as well as written testimony at a
later "constitutional hearing" designed to determine the need for
permanent suspension (suspensi6n definitiva).153 The United
States practice seems particularly restrictive when considering that
procedural due process in deportation proceedings is spindly com-
pared to the protection of federal rights in state trials. For exam-
ple, the special inquiry officer is both judge and prosecutor;
indigent aliens cannot obtain counsel at government expense; and
administrative appeal "is incapable of supervising adequately the
agency's adjudicative activities, since its institutional setting and
assumptions are little different from that of the initial decision-
maker." '254 One commentator concludes:
Thus aliens have often been left to the mercy of adminis-
trative authority in habeas proceedings, not because of limi-
tations on the power of the writ, but because their substantive
rights are limited. That process which is due an alien is not
necessarily coextensive with the constitutional protection af-
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 276 (1966); Bufalino v. Ken-
nedy, 116 U.S. App. D.C. 266 (1963).
250. GORDON & ROSENFELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 8.7 (1967),
as quoted in R. SOKOL, supra note 172, at 42 n.53.
251. The power to expel aliens, being essentially a power of political
branches of government, the legislative and executive, may be exercised
entirely through executive officers, with such opportunity for judicial
review of their action as Congress may see fit to authorize or permit.
Immigration and Naturalization Act § 241(a), as amended, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251
(a) (1970). See also Kasravi v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 400
F.2d 675 (1968).
252. LAw oF AMPARO arts. 17, 73 (xiii), 123-24.
253. Id. arts. 78, 80, 130-32.
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forded a citizen. Substantive constitutional rights may even
vary between individual aliens on the basis of such factors as
whether residency has been established or entry is being
sought. 
255
A final issue on which standards of reviewability differ is the
interpretation and domestic application of international treaties.
Treaties and executive agreements seem to comprise one of the
few issue areas ordinarily declared a political question by the
United States Supreme Court.256 In several well known cases
rejecting individual constitutional rights claims, the Court has held
as non-justiciable the question whether an act of state has been
recognized by the United States under executive agreement, and
the question whether treaty interpretations given by the Executive
Branch are generally final.25 7  By way of comparison the Mexi-
can Supreme Court has determined that the application of treaties
to domestic residents is a matter of constitutional law and thus
eminently reviewable. 258  Ih one case, the Administrative Cham-
ber granted standing to an amparo petitioner to challenge execu-
tion of a treaty violating "the formalities outlined in the Constitu-
tion, . . . according to [the due process and "legality" guarantees
of] Article 14 especially." Further,
under these conditions if the amparo is a means for con-
trolling the legality of authoritative acts it must be consid-
ered admissible [when] it relates to the application of an in-
ternational treaty, since to do the contrary would leave the
255. Id. at 1243.
256. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); M. SHAPIRO, supra note
21, at 177; note 29 supra, regarding Professor Sharpf's "functional categories."
257. In U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), and U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S.
203 (1942), the Court ordered the New York courts to honor demands of the
United States as assignee of the Soviet Government under the Litvinov Assign-
ment of 1933. In upholding the assignee against the deposits of certain banks,
the decision confirmed the "extra territorial operation of confiscatory Soviet de-
crees." The Court has also applied the element of "finality" to the United
States' abrogation of a treaty: "The question of whether our government is
justified in disregarding its engagements with another nation is not one for the
determination of the courts." Chinese Exclusion Cases, 130 U.S. 581, 602 (1889).
See also Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902), holding the right to habeas
corpus in international extradition cases as within "the conclusion of the execu-
tive department of the Government" where treaty obligations are involved. In
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), the Court refused
to examine the validity of a foreign expropriation by a government duly recog-
nized, even if the complaint alleges that the expropriation violated customary
international law.
258. See cases cited in R. BAKER, supra note 5, at 163 n.77.
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citizen without any defenses. 259
This is the direction of the Mexican amparo courts despite the fact
that they have almost completely deferred to the Executive on other
matters of foreign policy.260
One qualification may provide the reader with some perspec-
tive: judicial practices of limited reviewability in the United
States are closer to the Mexican brand of "judicial activism" in the
areas discussed than the wording of many of the cases cited might
indicate. In regard to the treaty interpretation issue, for example,
the United States Court has insisted that the Fair Labor Standards
Act should apply to civilian workers on leased military bases in the
Bermudas, in spite of the State Department's objection that such
a decision would "embarrass American relations with Britain. '261
Martin Shapiro also points out that the execution of treaties is
almost, but not quite, an absolute political question.262 A similarly
activist flavor can be detected in many other recent United States
decisions in non or limited-reviewability issue areas. One need
mention only the recent Flast v. Cohen break-through regarding
taxpayers' suits on first amendment grounds,2 63 O'Callahan v.
Parker regarding habeas corpus review for certain kinds of
courts-martial, 264 the alien "right-to-work" cases and minimal
procedural due process holdings in deportation cases, 26 5 and
the Fair Labor Standards Act decision in regard to treaty appli-
cations.
It may be concluded that the Mexican federal courts, espe-
cially in their exercise of amparo jurisdiction, are not as passively
oriented to the Executive Branch as is commonly assumed. In a
few areas, they are even more activist than their counterparts in
the United States: most striking here is the broad reviewability
259. Amparo en revisidn de Manuel Brana Li, 98 S.J.F. na 6poca 61, 3a parte
(Administrative) (1965).
260. R. BAKER, supra note 5, at 162.
261. Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948).
262. The Court will not interpret or seek to enforce treaties in which
such public rights as sovereignty over territory are involved. It will
interpret treaties in order to enforce public or private rights arising from
them. Whether public or private rights are involved, however, it will
not determine the validity of a treaty or seek to enforce it against
alleged abrogations or violations by the United States government.
M. SHAPIRo, supra note 21, at 177.
263. See text with notes 52-57 supra.
264. Text and notes 227-28 supra.
265. Text and notes 240-42 supra.
Vol. 3
53
Schwarz: Judges Under the Shadow: Judicial Independence in the United Stat
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1973
JUDGES UNDER THE SHADOW
of federal and state tax laws and military courts-martials. 266
V. INDEPENDENCE MEASURED: THE FREQUENCY
AND DIRECTION OF "ANTI-GOVERNMENT" DECISIONS
A. The Mexican and United States Supreme Courts
The Mexican Supreme Court has pressed officialdom vigor-
ously in several key policy areas. 67 Amparo courts appear willing
to tackle almost every kind of procedural abuse in the administra-
tion and interpretation of laws as long as litigants meet the tech-
nical requisites for bringing the writ. Those subjected to rigor-
ous constitutional standards via the amparo include judges, ad-
ministrative tribunals, municipal officials, ordinary bureaucrats
and agency chiefs, and law enforcement officers.268  In at least
two ways, however, Mexican federal judges have relied on Profes-
sor Bickel's "passive virtues" falling short of declaring the ques-
tion non-reviewable. One, the Supreme and District Courts rarely
challenge basic governmental policies by upholding "constitution-
ality amparos" (called amparos contra leyes) 269 against statutes,
administrative regulations, and presidential decrees. Two, Mex-
ican federal courts will defer to the discretion of responsible author-
ities in the face of certain politically sensitive issues, even while
deciding on the merits.
The reluctance to void governmental enactments on constitu-
tional grounds is primarily the result of an unfavorable congres-
sional response in 1958 to this style of judicial activism: by
granting monopoly jurisdiction over all "constitutionality ampa-
ros" to the Plenary Court, the Congress ensured that it would be
an awkward and rarely successful remedy. 270 Fourteen out of a
Court of twenty-one Ministers must now approve the five consec-
utive "theses" or decisions on the same legal point as necessary
to establish jurisprudencia regarding the challenged law.271  This
is required in a body already rendered unwieldy by its organiza-
tion into four chambers dealing with highly disparate subject mat-
266. See text and notes 214-26, 229-36 supra.
267. 'See text and notes 206-12 supra.
268. See this author's revision of Professor Scott's assessment of the politi-
cal efficacy of the Mexican courts in note 205 supra.
269. See notes 5 and 192, for a brief outline of the "constitutionality
amparo" procedure and effects.
270. Note 192 supra; see also R. BAKEn, supra note 5, at 272.
271. LAW OF AMPARO art. 192.
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ter, whose members have little formal interaction with those of the
other chambers. 272  It is understandable that long-time Supreme
Court Minister Felipe Tena Ramirez could recall only six jurispru-
dential declarations against statutes, decrees, or regulations be-
tween 1958 and 1966, a time when the Court decided more than
1,000 cases involving amparos contra leyes!273  When the Court
does sustain such challenges, it more often directs them against
state rather than federal legislation. Rarely does it ever question
laws assigned a priority by the President and his "ruling family"
within the PRI.274 In direct contrast, the United States Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional ten acts of Congress and many
times that number of state laws during 1960-1967.275 In the
three years of 1961-1963, for example, the Court invalidated no
less than forty-five state acts.276
Any survey of Mexican judicial output as it compares with
that of the United States must incorporate Pablo Gonzalez Casa-
272. Outside of the open deliberations of the Plenary Court every Tuesday,
members of the Court meet most regularly with their own five-man chamber
(Penal, Administrative, Civil, and Labor) in both formal session and informal
conferences throughout the week. The most intensive interaction over case ma-
terials, however, seems to occur as the ministers of that chamber circulate and
comment on "draft opinions" (proyectos) submitted by the "reporting minister"
(ministro relator). See LAW OF AMPARo arts. 185-91, outlining some of the
procedures used by the chambers in introducing, discussing, circulating, and
voting on such opinions, along with provisions for dissenting and concurring
opinions.
273. Tena Ramirez, La rejorma de 1968, en materia administrativa, al
Poder Judicial de la Federaci6n, 10 EL FORO 55, 68 (1968). The total of 1,000
came from INFORME ... (1958-1966): Annex 11. Because of the Plenary
monopoly granted in 1958, delay became the chief enemy of fairness in disposing
of "amparos against the laws." The backlog of such cases in the Supreme Court
went from 800 in 1958 to 2,422 in 1966. Tena Ramfrez, supra, at 68. This
author's survey of 57 important theses of the Plenary Court in 1968 (not all
"constitutionality amparos") revealed an average wait of more than six years
for plaintiffs, from admission of petitions to judgment. INFORME . . . 1968:
Annex 10, at 137-80.
274. Of this author's sample of 49 fully-reported amparos against the laws
decided during a thirty-three month period in 1964-1968, only eight repre-
sented a victory for the complainant, and five of these involved state rather than
federal laws. S.J.F. (January, 1964-July, 1966, June-August, 1968).
275. J. SIGLER, THE CoURTS & PUBLIC POLICY 218 (1970).
276. McCloskey, Reflections on the Warren Court, in LAW, POLITICS, & THE
FEDERAL COURTS 164, 177 (H. Jacob ed. 1967). In all fairness, McCloskey's
data are intended to demonstrate the hyper-activism of the Warren years. Even
during the "least-activist" periods, however, the Supreme Court's invalidation rate
far surpasses that of the Mexican Plenary Court. Between 1942 and 1952, for
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nova's exhaustive study of decisions made by Mexico's Supreme
Court during the period 1917-1960.277 Professor Gonzdlez, a po-
litical scientist at the National University, sought to measure the
political independence of the Court in terms of concessions to
amparo plaintiffs who named the President of the Republic as at
least one of the responsible authorities.278 Three of his findings
are especially interesting in relation to judicial independence in
the United States.
First, he established that plaintiffs won their amparo suits or
gained "suspensions" in 34 per cent of the cases involving presi-
dential action during the forty-three-year period. The remaining
66 per cent comprised petitions denied (34 per cent), dismissed,
or not decided because of abandonment of the suit or other tech-
nical grounds pursuant to the "inadmissibility" and "discontinu-
ance" provisions of the amparo law.279 It is significant that con-
cessions to plaintiffs increased from 26 per cent of all cases sur-
veyed during 1917-1940, to more than 39 per cent between 1940
and 1960.280 Such data bear striking resemblance to Robert
Scigliano's finding that the United States Government prevailed
in 64 per cent, or lost in 36 per cent of the cases in which it
appeared as a party before the Supreme Court between 1900 and
1967.281 Professor Gonzdlez concludes that the Mexican Court
"acts with a certain independence with relation to the Executive
Power, and constitutes, on occasion, a brake on the acts of the Pres-
277. Gonzdlez Casanova, supra note 6, at 29-31, Tables V-VIII in Ap-
pendix.
278. Two recent revisions of the amparo law would now distort or miti-
gate the significance of using the President as the exclusive referent for measur-
ing judicial independence. The changes in 1958 caused the President to be
less frequently named as the responsible authority; only in amparos against the
laws must the President be challenged as the executing authority and the case
decided in Plenary Court on the issue of abstract constitutionality. LAW OF
AMPARO art. 84 (I,a); see also text and notes 269-74 supra. In such cases, the
Plenary Court disproportionately favors the legislature and all other responsible
authorities. Id.
The 1968 reforms also devalued the importance of the "President as re-
sponsible authority" for measurement purposes. The President may now be
represented in all amparo proceedings by cabinet secretaries, sub-secretaries, bu-
reau chiefs (in the absence of any of the former), and the Procurador General
(attorney general) when so designated and in: a matter "relative to.his charge."
LAw OF AMPARO art. 19.
279. Gonzdlez Casanova, supra note 6, at 31.
280. See id. Table V, at 186-87.
281. R. SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT & THE PRESmENCY 177 (1971).
1973
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ident of the Republic or his collaborators. 28 2  He qualifies his
thesis, however, in a fashion similar to Robert Dahl's view of the
United States Court as part of the dominant political alliance and
to what Jacque Lambert saw in the more independent Latin Amer-
ican judiciaries: 2 3 that although the Mexican tribunal exercises
real power, it is not blocked "because on the great issues it follows
the policy of the Executive, and serves in fact to give him greater
stability.
28 4
A second major conclusion of the Gonzdlez Casanova study
is that Mexican judicial independence has benefited primarily the
old landholding class (latifundistas) and the "new bourgeois in-
terests" (intereses de la nueva burguesia). The latter comprises
the corporate employers, financial institutions, and businessmen of
urban Mexico. Together with the "great landed proprietors," they
are the upper-middle income groups who have resisted the re-
forms of the Revolution.
285
Finally, the sheer volume of decisions by the Mexican Court
suggests an important dimension of judicial independence. Ac-
cording to Professor Gonzdlez, the Supreme Court decided fully
3,173 cases involving the President as respondent; more than 60
per cent of these (2,243) occurred during the last twenty years
of the 1917-1960 period.28 6  The Court's activity is even more
impressive when looking at its total output. Between 1963 and
1971, the High Court resolved some 67,700 cases of all kinds; al-
most 90 per cent (60,100) of these were amparos, or direct chal-
lenges of some form of governmental abuse.287  This represents
an average of 6,683 amparos annually for the nine-year period. In
contrast, the United States Supreme Court disposed of a record
3,645 cases on its 1970-1971 docket, but only 449 were by writ-
ten opinion or per curiam decision, that is a dismissal rate of more
282. Gonzilez Casanova, supra note 6, at 31.
283. See text with notes 10-17 supra.
284. Gonzilez Casanova, supra note 6, at 31.
285. Id.
286. Id. Table V, at 186-87.
287. INFORME . . . (1963-1971): Annex 11. These figures do not include
the 1000 or so cases "transmitted" or disposed in some way by the President of
the Court each year. The average of 6,683 also encompasses the smaller yearly
caseload for the Court caused by the 1968 reforms in the Law of Amparo,
shifting cases of lesser importance to the Collegiate Circuit Courts. See text
and notes 318-23 infra. The dispositions of the Supreme Court during 1963-
1968 averaged 8,416; during 1969-1971, 5,700.
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than 88 per cent. About 73 per cent of the written opinions in-
volved federal, state, or local governments as parties (123 out of
168 decisions). 288  In the same year the Mexican Court decided
5,319 cases of all kinds with about one-third being dismissed,
all but 388 of which were amparo actions. 289  Not only do these
figures indicate the scope of activity and dynamism of the Mexican
Supreme Court in relation to complaints against the government,
but that the citizenry itself "is aware of judicial remedies and will-
ing to seek such relief when aggrieved by official action.
'290
Professor Gonzdlez's conclusion that the principal function of
the Mexican Court is to provide haven for the propertied elites
of Mexico should not be accepted without qualification. His
finding is not wholly supportable in light of the over-all filings and
decisional output of the Labor, Administrative, and Penal Cham-
bers. His conclusions on the 1940-1960 period, for example, are
based entirely on the occupational backgrounds of plaintiffs filing
actions in labor and agrarian matters and naming the President
as the defendant. But even in this limited sample he does not
consider the Court's actual responses to the petitions presented.
Thus, Gonzdlez's own data on agrarian-rights decisions indicates
a higher percentage of suits won by ejidos and small rural propri-
etors, possessing certificates of inaffectability, than those won by
private farmers of larger holdings, also with certificates. 29' More-
over, an analysis of eighty fully reported amparo cases,292 decided
288. The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 303-06 (1972).
289. INFORME... 1971: Annex 11.
290. See notes 7-9 supra and accompanying text.
291. Amparo and Suspensions
Plaintiff Conceded Denied Dismissed Others Total
Ejidos, Communi-
dades, Pueblos 16 3 24 7 51
Small Proprietors 29 3 56 20 108
Other Farmers 13 5 29 4 51
Total 58 12 109 31 210
Percentage 28 5 52 15 100
Source: Gonzilez Casanova, supra note 6, Table VIII, at 192.
292. In contrast to the record of the United States Supreme Court, the
Mexican Court does not publish in its Semanario Judicial de la Fed-
eraci6n the entire written opinion behind each thesis it adopts. Publication of
the full opinion requires a majority vote of the deciding chamber, when the
ministers consider that the case "involves legal questions of great importance or
its complexity may be difficult to comprehend by way of [mere] extract." Preface
to each monthly volume of S.J.F., paragraph VIII. The author's survey of
some 3,000 theses reported for January, 1964-July, 1966, disclosed only 415
partial or complete opinions.
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by the Labor Chamber during a thirty-three-month period during
the 1960's, revealed that employers and workers appeared as
plaintiffs on approximately a 1-1 ratio.293 Finally, and most sig-
nificantly, criminal defendants appealing their convictions or sen-
tences in state and federal courts constitute the greatest single por-
tion of the Court's caseload;2 94 and about half of these are success-
ful in amparo petitions to the Penal Chamber.2 95 Surely the vast
majority of such petitioners have far from an aristocratic or even
middle-class background.
Some quantitative comparisons can be made between the
rate of amparo judgments "against the government" in the Mexi-
can Supreme Court and the frequency of similar holdings in the
United States Court as expressed in full written opinions.2 96 Other
breakdowns will follow regarding the subject matter of such dis-
positions and the extent of pro-plaintiff rulings in the circuit and
district courts of Mexico. Perhaps to his surprise, the reader will
find that these comparisons do not comfortably fit any model of
complete judicial subservience to the President, Executive Branch,
PRI hierarchy, local jefes politicos, or any other political elites in
Mexico.297
Table I represents a survey made of amparo cases decided
by the Supreme Court as reported in the Semanario Judicial for
a thirty-three month period during 1964-1966 and 1968; they
293. SEMANARIO JUDICIAL DE LA FEDERACI6N (January, 1964-July, 1966,
June-August, 1968). These represent direct amparo cases brought against labor
arbitration boards; because such boards are marginally sympathetic to em-
ployees and unions, it is generally the employers-including government agen-
cies acting in a "patrimonial" capacity-who initiate the amparos. Direct labor
amparos take up about 22 percent of the Supreme Court's total caseload (average
filings for 1969-1971).
294. Direct amparos in criminal cases amounted to about 27 per cent of
the total filings in the Supreme Court during 1969-1971, or some 6600 out of
24,300 petitions. INFORME. . . (1969-1971): Annex 11.
295. See TABLE IV infra.
296. For both the Mexican and United States Courts, full written opinions
constitute a small percentage of the published decisions. See note 292 regard-
ing the Mexican practice, and TABLE III infra, for an example of United
States proportions.
297. This would include those distinguishing between "legal" or private-
law functioning of the Mexican courts and "political" or constitutional limits on
executive power, with the United States courts exemplifying the latter function.
It is difficult for this author to accept this all-too-facile but common distinction
in regard to Latin American judiciaries. See, e.g., M. NEEDLER, PoLITIcs &
SOCIETY IN MEXICO 42 (1971), an otherwise excellent analysis of the loci of
political power in Mexico, and text and notes 1-7 supra.
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are compared with the United States Court's final dispositions with
full written opinion during the three terms of 1966-1968.298 A
breakdown of these dispositions by subject matter appears in Table
IV.
TABLE I: Cases Disposed by Full Written Opinion
Other Dis-
Wona Lostb positionse Total
United States
Supreme Court 164 (46%) 132 (36%) 70 (18%) 366
Mexican Supreme
Court 191 (42%) 254 (56%) 9 (1.3%) 454
a. This column indicates the number of cases in which the Court's decision was
contra the government's position. "Government" means state, federal, or
local government or agency, or an individual in the suit participating in
an official capacity. All amparo cases, of course, are directed exclusively
against "governments."
b. Cases decided in favor of the government's position. A case is counted "for"
the government if as a party it prevails in part on the principal issue.
c. "Other dispositions" for the United States Court refers to all cases not in-
cluding the "government"-per the definition in a.-as designated parties;
i.e., litigation which is "private." For the Mexican Court, "other" refers to
cases remanded to other chambers of the Court or lower courts for lack of
competency, and similar administrative action.
Table II presents a clearer measure of "win-loss" ratios in
those cases where the government appeared as a party, by ex-
cluding all "other" dispositions of both high courts. For com-
parative purposes, the data of both the author and Robert Scig-
liano2 . regarding the United States Court are included below.
Scigliano's figures refer exclusively to the federal government as a
party.
TABLE II: Cases Disposed by Full Written Opinion Involving the





(1966-68) 164 (55.4%) 132 (44.6%) 296
(1961-67)b 124 (36%) 221 (64%) 345
Mexican Supreme
Courtc 191 (43%) 254 (57%) 445
a. For a definition of "Won" and "Lost" see Table I supra. "Government" is
defined the same as in Table I, except as stated below.
b. From SCIGLIANO, supra note 281, at 177, 178. The discrepancy between the
two success rates of government litigants, again, is attributable to Scigliano's
exclusive reference to the United States Government.
c. For the thirty-three month period cited in note 298 supra.
298. 81-83 HARV. L. REv. 128-29, 304-05, 280-81 (1967-1969); 79-108,
132-34 S.J.F. 6a 6poca (January, 1964-June, 1966, and June-August, 1968).
299. R. SCIGLIANO, supra note 281, at 177, 178; and id.
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By incorporating the number of cases dismissed for techni-
cal or other reasons, one can compare the output patterns of the
Mexican and United States high courts in greater dimension. Fig-
ures for the Mexican Court in Table III represent Professor Gon-
zblez's more comprehensive coverage of all cases decided between
1940 and 1960 wherein the President was a respondent.3 00 Data
for the United States tribunal dramatically contrasts the latter's
ability to control its own docket through the highly discretionary
writ of certiorari with the more obligatory jurisdiction of the Mexi-
can Court.8
0 2
TABLE III: Final Dispositions, Including Dispositions without Full Opinion
Fed. v. State Total
Wona Lost Dismissed Otherb Jurisdiction Sample
United States
Supreme Court 164 132 8081 70 8447c
(1966-68) (1.9%) (1.6%) (95.5%) (.01%) -
Mexican
Supreme Court 884 537 732 84 6 2243
(1940-60) (39.4%) (24%) (32.6%) (3.8%) (.2%)
a. For a definition of "Won" and "Lost" see Table I supra. "Government" in
the Mexican cases here refers exclusively to the President as responsible au-
thority; for dispositions of the United States Court, "government" is defined
as in Table I.
b. "Other" for the Mexican Court means cases remanded without action for lack
of jurisdiction, etc.; for a definition of "other" as it applies to the United
States Court, see Table I, supra.
c. Total dispositions for the three terms were 8,953 cases; however, 117 were
subtracted as written opinions lacking anti- or pro-government designations,
and 389 more were deleted as per curiam opinions without such designations.
The categorical breakdown of cases in Table IV reveals the
varied response of the Mexican and United States Supreme Courts
300. Gonzalez Casanova, supra note 6, Table V, at 186.
301. See note 298 supra.
302. The mandatory nature of the Supreme Court's amparo jurisdiction was
dramatically revised by the 1968 legislative reforms. The Administrative Cham-
ber may now decide any "legality" amparo case involving a federal agency which
the ministers deem "of transcending importance for the national interest" re-
gardless of the monetary amount in controversy. ORGANIC LAW FEDERaL JU-
DICIRY art. 25 (I1). Similar ambiguities in the new regulatory statutes permit
the Civil and Labor Chambers varying degrees of selectivity over cases they can
hear. See id. arts. 26 (III), 27 (III, a). Many Mexicans viewed these changes
as bringing the Supreme Court, especially the Administrative Chamber, closer to
the highly discretionary certiorari practice of the United States Court in cases
arising from the United States Courts of Appeal. Felipe Tena Ramirez, however,
points out the contrasts with the United States writ of certiorari; for example
(a) the new discretion of the Administrative -Chamber does not apply to state
agencies or tribunals and (b) the Circuit Court can quash further appeal of the
case on the ground that it finds no such "transcending importance" in it. Tena
Ramirez, supra note 273, at 67.
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to different subject matter. The subject-matter categories below
are based on the Mexican division into "penal," "administra-
tive," "civil," and "labor" case classifications and Supreme Court
chambers. Each of the four sub-headings derives its title in turn
from the competency of the authority challenged in amparo com-
plaints. Sources are the same as those in Table I.





















































Supreme Court 164 (46%) 132 (36%) 70 (18%) 366
This Table represents a survey of Mexican cases for the years 1964-66, 1968;
and United States cases in the years 1966-68.
For the significance of the "Won" and "Lost" columns see Table I supra.
See explanations for "other" in Table I supra.
Cases in parentheses were appealed to the Administrative Chamber from
federal district court rulings on "legality" amparo complaints against state
and federal administrative agencies. The horizontal column of figures im-
mediately below combines these with the "constitutionality" amparo dispo-
sitions of the Plenary Court.
S
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The data in Table IV suggest that the Mexican Supreme
Court most sharply deviates from the norms of the other agencies
of government when it decides complaints in criminal and admin-
istrative matters. The Administrative Chamber has developed an
increasing independent posture in mandating procedural fair-
ness in agrarian expropriation proceedings, state and federal tax
administration, military decisions on pensions and salaries, and
domestic applications of international treaties. 3 ' Particularly
striking in examining the decisional record is the frequency with
which the Administrative Chamber decides against the federal "fis-
cal" authorities in such broad and important policy areas as fed-
eral disbursements, fines, and revenue levies. This phenomenon
is perhaps attributable to the Chamber's unique relationship with
the Federal Fiscal Tribunal whose numerous decisions against the
government are regularly upheld by the Chamber.
30 4
The extent of the Mexican Supreme Court's independence in
criminal amparo matters is less clear. Perhaps because it lacks a
reinforcing buffer, or "lightning rod" of quasi-judicial specialists
comparable to the Fiscal Tribunal, the Penal Chamber, more readi-
303. See text with notes 182-204, and section IV supra. A leading admin-
istrative lawyer and ex-Rector of the National University's law faculty isolated
five areas of administrative law most affected by amparo decisions of the Su-
preme Court: agrarian reform, tax assessments, commercial and professional li-
censing, expropriation of private commercial property, and corporate structure and
stock transfer. Interview with Lic. C6sar Sepdlveda, in Mexico City, Aug. 7,
1968.
304. See text with notes 222-26 supra. The Chamber upholds its "right
arm" in at least 60 per cent of all assessment cases wherein the federal govern-
ment has appealed via the revisi6n fiscal. See text with note 225 supra. The
1968 reforms in the Organic Law, Federal Judiciary, and those of 1967 in the
Federal Fiscal Code greatly restricted the ease with which the government could
bring revisiones fiscales directly to the Supreme Court. See ORGANIC LAW,
FEDERAL JUDICIARY art. 242. The result has been a marked decline in the number
of such cases decided by the Court; e.g., from 233 in 1968, to 91 in 1970.
One specialized study emphasized what the relationship between the Fiscal
Tribunal and the Administrative Chamber means for the aspiring litigant ag-
grieved by some public financial policy:
Supreme Court decisions have significantly influenced the Department
of the Federal District's tax administration. In other areas of urban
development, it appears that judicial review has been of little import-
tance in reforming administrative practices. . . . [A] problem associa-
ated with amparo suits in the urban development field is the absence
of an administrative tribunal like the Fiscal Court to translate Supreme
Court Jurisprudence into primary obligations for administrative officials.
HERmMAN & LEE, supra note 224, at 44-45. The same study also found that
urban taxpayers won about 80 per cent of their cases in the Fiscal Tribunal
against property taxes assessed on an "estimated rental rate" basis, or about five
per cent of the total caseload of the Tribunal. Id. at 63.
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ily than the Administrative Chamber, appears to withdraw to its
''passive virtues" when confronted with politically sensitive issues.
Pressure from the criminal law profession, however, has influ-
enced the Penal ministers toward a position of at least deciding
most of these issues."' 8 Certainly the most salient and contro-
versial example of the Penal Chamber's judicial modesty was its
decision on the former federal crime of "social dissolution" (diso-
luci6n social)."°6 In 1966 the Penal Chamber of the Supreme
Court finally ruled on nine separate amparo appeals from convic-
tions under the anti-subversion statute and other crimes in federal
trial courts.3"7 Most were radical labor leaders who had been in
prison since their arrests in 1959 for fomenting a national strike
against the government-operated railroads. That the President of
the Court remitted the accumulated appeals to the Penal Chamber
instead of the Plenary Court indicated the Court's overwhelming
desire to avoid judging the constitutionality of the controversial
statute, in spite of the fact that the plaintiffs had raised such a
challenge. Regarding several of the cases, however, the unani-
mous opinions went far beyond the "legality" of the trial judge's
interpretation of the statute in denying the merits of the amparo
petitions:
Petitioners consigned to all their members within reach the
method and form necessary to actuate the ultimate goal of
* . . a socialist state, through use of printed Communist lit-
erature. [They also sought] to encrustate themselves in the
working masses in order to agitate them under the pretext
of obtaining quick recovery of all their rights under the Con-
stitution. . . . [With] this method they would eventually
destroy the structure of the State, and in its place find and
construct a model of a socialist state patterned after those in
countries like China, the Soviet Union, Poland, etc.308
305. See, e.g., the plea for equity and active justice in the processing of
criminal law cases, especially with reference to trial and appellate judges, by the
incoming President of the Academy of Penal Processal Law, National Associa-
tion of Lawyers. Adolfo Aguilar y Quevedo, Justicia, meta suprema derecho,
norma ineludible, DISCURSO PRONUNCIADO EN LA TOMA DR POSESION DE LA
PRESIDENCIA DE LA ACADEMIA DE DERCHO PROCESAL PENAL (Mexico, 1968).
306. FEDERAL PENAL CODE arts. 145, 145 bis (1969). These provisions
were finally abolished by Decree of July 27, 1970. See note 313 inf ra.
307. Amparos directos de Valentin Campa S., Francisco Carballo S., Dio-
nisio Encinas, Roberto Cruz G., Enrique Herndndez C., Gilberto Rojo R. y otros,
Enrique Ortega A., Alberto Lumbreras, y Demetrio Vallejo Martinez y otros,
105 S.J.F. 6a 6poca 12, 2a parte (Penal) (March 24, 1966).
308. Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
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In their violent confrontations with federal riot police and
the army during 1968 and 1969, university students commonly
voiced demands that the President and Congress rescind the am-
biguously phrased anti-subversion statute."0 9 Although top on
the Mexican students' purge list, disoluci6n social or a compar-
ably broad anti-subversion law seemed generally acceptable to the
nation's legal community. 310 Political dissenters, in fact, would
find only partial constitutional support in the language of articles
6 through 9.311 Article 6, for example, the Mexican Constitu-
tion's principal guarantee of free speech, holds:
The expression of ideas shall not be subject to any judicial
or administrative investigation, unless it offends good morals,
infringes the rights of others, incites to crime, or disturbs the
public order. (emphasis added)
Not surprisingly, the modesty of the Supreme Court and the legal
profession in dealing with the ambiguities and "chilling effects" of
the social dissolution statute was reflected in several federal trial
court rulings on amparo petitions. After hundreds of students
and other protesters had been arrested, jailed, and allegedly
mistreated by police after the disturbances in 1968, one judge
threw out no less than eighty-six such petitions in a single action;
they were held inadmissible because the police acts "were not de-
termined, nor imminent, nor probable in the future." 312  Nine-
teen months after arrest uncounted persons remained imprisoned
without trial.' 13
309. See K. JOHNSON, MEXICAN DEMOCRACY: A CRITIcAL VIEW, at 152 and
passim. The most challenged section of the statute read:
[The penalties of this section will apply to any] foreigner or Mexican
national who in written or spoken fashion, or by whatever other means,
engages in political propoganda among foreigners or Mexican na-
tionals, diffusing ideas, programs, or other norms of action of whatever
foreign government which disturb the public order or affect the
sovereignty of the State of Mexico.
FEDERAL PENAL CODE art. 145 (pre-1970).
310. The most conspicuous of the law's critics interviewed by this writer in
1968 and 1971 were the President of the criminal lawyer's association cited supra
note 305 and Lic. Santiago Ofiate, both of Mexico City. The majority of law-
yers interviewed, however, say the disoluci6n social statute as a necessary though
undesirable weapon against "fifth columnists," with Cuban-supported guerillas
as the main target. For a more detailed analysis supporting the main tenets of
the controversial law, see J. Reyes Tayabas, Estudio sobre los Articulos 145 y
145 bis. del C6digo Penal que rige para toda la Repdblica en materia de fuero
federal, 12 EL FoRo 23 (1968).
311. See id. at 42-44.
312. El Heraldo (Mexico City), Sept. 4, 1968, at 1 and passim.
313. Times of the Americas (Coral Gables, Fla.), Mar. 11, 1970. At the
initiative of President Gustavo Diaz Ordiz, Congress finally repealed the social
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The Plenary and Penal Chambers of the Court have occa-
sionally responded with something like principle in dealing with
politically significant cases. On the question of soldiers accused of
non-service-connected crimes, for example, the Plenary Court has
granted competency to civilian rather than military courts. 14 The
real record of the Court on criminal matters, however, is one of
general and impartial availability to defendants aggrieved by er-
rors in the day-to-day functioning of ordinary trial and appellate
courts, errors vitally important perhaps only to the individuals af-
fected. In 1968, because of the great number of direct amparo
appeals from final judgments brought annually (6,000 in 1968
alone), and the resulting backlog in the Penal Chamber (3,000
at the end of 1967),'315 the Congress shifted to the Collegiate Cir-
cuit Courts the direct review of all but federal-military convic-
tions and sentences of more than five years' imprisonment.316 In
spite of its present jurisdiction, the Penal Chamber received more
than 2,000 criminal amparos in 1971. This, plus the nearly 50
percent success rate of petitioners,317 suggests that the Chamber
does perform effectively as a "judicial ombudsman."
dissolution statute in July, 1970. It is noteworthy that the federal courts played
no catalytic role in developing pressure for challenging the law, although a num-
ber of prominent lawyers, bar associations,, and legal scholars testified on both
sides of the issue in Congressional hearings. Thus, as with settlements of elec-
tion irregularities and religious expression issues, so also did Mexican elective and
administrative officials make this important legal decision without judicial inter-
ference or guidance. See CAMARA DE DrPTAtos. PRESIDENTE DE LA COMISION
EDITORIAL. DEROGACION DE Los ARTS. 145 Y 145 BIS DEL CODIGO PENAL PARA EL
DISTrro Y TERRITORiOS FEDERALES (1970).
The result was not entirely a libertarian victory. In place of articles 145
and 145 bis, the 1970 reformers instituted a new title called "Crimes against the
Security of the Nation;" i.e., FEDERAL PENAL CODE arts. 127-45, 364-66, 419
(1970). Here the Congress attempted to define more precisely subversive acts
such as "treason," "espionage," "sedition," "rebellion," etc. But much of the old
style vagueness and overbreadth in regard to free expression of ideas remained in
the language of the new law. For example, a citizen may still receive up to six
years' imprisonment for rioting if, among other acts, he "threatens an authority by
intimidating or obligating him to make some determination." Further, any one
who "directs, organizes, incites, compels or economically patronizes others" to
commit said crime may suffer the same fate. Id. art. 131. The description of this
"crime" could well apply to the principal function of opposition political parties
or pressure groups in any democratic nation.
314. See note 234 supra.
315. INFORME. . .1968: Annex 11.
316. The Supreme Court also would hear cases wherein civil damages aris-
ing from a crime were accompanied by a sentence of more than five years' im-
prisonment. ORGANIC LAW, FEDERAL JuDIciARY art. 24 (I1).
317. See TABLE IV supra.
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B. The Mexican Federal District and Circuit Courts
Essentially the same tribute could be paid to the other judi-
cial components of the amparo system. Special attention should
go to the Collegiate Circuit Courts, whose review power was greatly
enhanced with the 1968 reforms in the Law of Amparo and Or-
ganic Law of the Federal Judiciary. Roughly parallel in function
to the United States Courts of Appeal, the circuit courts now share
jurisdiction over a number of cases formerly heard exclusively by
the four chambers of the Supreme Court. 18  The most important
changes expanded the number of three-judge circuit courts to
thirteen, located throughout the country, and empowered them to
formulate their own jurisprudencia in a fashion similar to that of
the Supreme Court. 31 9  The thirteen circuit courts disposed of
21,349 cases in 1971; almost all were amparos or amparo-related,
representing an increase of more than 175 per cent over 1968.82 o
An analysis of a typical Collegiate Circuit Court, with a juris-
diction over most of northwestern Mexico, reveals that about one
in four amparo petitioners succeeded "against the government."'8 2 1
During the period of June 1, 1970 through May 30, 1971, the Fifth
Circuit Court in Hermosillo, Sonora, decided some 1,330 "legal-
ity" amparos of all kinds. Almost 60 per cent of these were direct
amparo appeals from final judgments rendered in civil and crimi-
nal courts, state administrative tribunals, and labor arbitration
boards.32 2  The remainder were indirect amparo appeals from
amparo judgments in federal district courts (called amparos en
revisi6n); they involved, in criminal cases, errors committed by
318. See text and notes 302, 316 supra; ORGANIC LAW, FEDERAL JUDICIARY
arts. 11, 24, 25, 26, 27, and 7 bis. These changes drew the jurisdictional
boundaries between the Supreme and circuit courts essentially around the amount
of morey involved in the controversy (in regard to civil and administrative
cases); severity of the sentence (penal); level of the respondent authority-i.e.,
whether a state or federal tribunal (penal, civil, and administrative); and the
social or "transcending" importance of the issue itself (civil, administrative, and
labor).
319. LAw oF AMPARO art. 193 bis. Such jurisprudencia requires, however,
a unanimous vote of the three-man circuit court; the appropriate chamber of the
Supreme Court decides between "contradictory" precedents., Id. art. 195 his.
320. INFORME. . . 1971: Annexes 9-10.
321. Data obtained from the monthly records of the Collegiate Circuit
Court, Fifth Circuit (Hermosillo, Sonora), for the period June 1, 1970-May 30,
1971. The author appreciates access to such records given by the Secretary of
Accords, Lic. Francisco C6rdoba Romero.
322. Id. See also jurisdictional sources and delineations note 329 supra.
Vol. 3
67
Schwarz: Judges Under the Shadow: Judicial Independence in the United Stat
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1973
JUDGES UNDER THE SHADOW
judges, prosecutors, or jailers outside the trial or final sentence of
the court. 23
Although petitioners won one quarter of all amparo cases,
only in direct amparo decisions can the exact percentage of "anti-
government" holdings be determined. This is because court data
does not show the number of indirect amparos wherein the re-
sponsible authority was appealing a "final suspension" ordered by
the federal district judge. Except in rare circumstances, the gov-
ernment cannot initiate direct amparo litigation and as a respond-
ent must appear by some person or agency, for example, as judge,
bureaucrat, or labor board.3 24  The important finding, then, is
that direct amparo petitioners, the majority of litigants before the
Fifth Circuit, were granted relief in 24 per cent of the cases de-
cided. Government respondents gained denials on the merits in
53 per cent, and 23 per cent were dismissed or remanded for lack
of jurisdiction. Challengers of state and federal labor boards,
constituting about one-third of the direct amparo caseload,
achieved the highest success rate of 31 per cent. The success rate
for appeals by convicts was third lowest with 16 per cent.3 25
For many Mexican attorneys and common people interviewed
in 1968 and 1971, the Federal District Courts represent the "thin
black line" against official abuse in the towns and countryside.
They are undermanned-only fifty-five judges scattered through-
out the nation-and woefully understaffed. Nonetheless, the dis-
trict courts receive and process an enormous number of amparo
323. Pursuant to ORGANIc LAW, FEDERAL JUDICIARY arts. 24, 7 bis., the only
amparos en revisi6n heard by the Penal Chamber, other than cases involving
"constitutionality" precedent already established, are those which concern extra-
judgment violations of the "fundamental rights" protected by article 22 of the
Constitution. The circuit courts, therefore, are empowered to review the rest of
these abuses as they come up from trial determination in the federal, district
courts.
324. Only when "their patrimonial interests are affected" may official agen-
cies act as amparo plaintiffs. LAW OF AMPARo art. 9. The Supreme Court has
defined such "interests" essentially as statutory responsibilities of securing and
controlling large amounts of capital and real property, as well as its role in pub-
lic employment. COMPILACI6N, 3a parte (Administrative): Thesis 87, at 108.
Government agencies most frequently appear as amparo plaintiffs before the
Civil and Labor divisions of the Court, challenging lower court or labor board
decisions which attacked their discretion on matters of public property or em-
ployee relations. See also I. BURGOA, supra note 5, at 331-36, for a critique of
this standing for government on the ground that the amparo is fundamentally
and exclusively a vehicle for protecting individual constitutional rights.
325. Data from Fifth Collegiate Circuit, cited in note 321 supra.
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petitions each year: some 58,000 filings in 1971, or 72 per cent
of all amparos entering the Federal Judiciary that year.82  These'
trial judges in amparo cases deal primarily with appeals for help
by criminal suspects and defendants claiming that their injuries
at the hands of law enforcement cannot await final dispositions of
ordinary trials or appellate proceedings. The applications are
then processed with the speed and procedural economy outlined
for indirect amparo trials.3 27  More than 62 per cent (36,500) of
the district courts' caseload in 1971 comprised such emergency
petitions for relief from criminal proceedings.8 28  The "little man"
does therefore avail himself of the amparo writ, at the local level
as well as at the Supreme Court Building in Mexico City.
Given the accessibility of the Federal District Courts, how
do they respond to these complaints? In 1971, the record for such
tribunals was as follows:
3 29
TABLE V: Amparos Disposed by Final Judgment in Mexican Federal
District Courts, by Subject Matter, 1971
Cases Remanded,
Dismissed, com- Total




and Labor 7,206 (13%) 5,989 (11%) 42,787 (76%) 55,982
Administrativeb (14%) 13,164 (20%)
and Labor 1,167
Total 2,011 (14%) 1,002 (7%) 11,318 (79%) 14,331
Criminal (12.5%) 35,325 (63%)
and Civil 6,326
Total 5,195 (12.5%) 4,987 (12%) 31,469 (75.5%) 41,651
a. For a definition of "Won" and "Lost" see Table I supra. For the purposes
of this Table, "government" means any court, police agency, administrator,
or labor arbitration board named as the responsible authority in the amparo
petition of the plaintiff.
b. The lnforme of the Supreme Court did not break down the concessions and
denials of amparo petitions as to Administrative, Labor, Civil, and Criminal
categories, although it did give the total number of cases decided in all four
categories. Because of the disproportionately large number of Administrative
and Criminal amparos, however, one can reasonably assume that the per-
centages given for each set (Administrative-Labor, Criminal-Civil) approxi-
mate the percentages given for the two main categories.
326. INFORME . . . 1971: Annexes 1, 2, and passim.
327. See LAw OF AMPARO arts. 78-80, 117-18, 123-24, 130-32, 145-57.
For a brief comparison of these proceedings with Anglo-American uses of
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, injunction, and "removal" petitions, see
Schwarz, The Mexican Writ of Amparo: Extraordinary Remedy against Official
Abuse of Individual Rights: Part 1, 10 PUBLIC AFFAIRS REPORT No. 6 (1969).
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Before scoffing at the fact that only 12.5 per cent of criminal
amparo petitions were granted on their merits, consider that less
than 5 per cent of the applications for federal habeas corpus in
the United States were decided by the Federal District Courts in
favor of the applicant for the writ; the other 95 per cent were
held to be without merit.330
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
As compared with United States federal courts, to what ex-
tent do the Mexican amparo courts limit the exercise of govern-
mental power? One method of answering this central question is
primarily through analyzing and quantifying decisions; the deci-
sions or lack thereof reflecting the courts' own perceptions of their
roles in response to issues brought before them. There are, of
course, many other comparative indicators of judicial independ-
ence and discretion.3"' This article has reviewed the accessibility
of amparo courts and the willingness of a vast number of indi-
viduals to seek such forums when aggrieved by official action. 3 2
Also mentioned were some of the problems and prospects for en-
forcing politically significant decisions.333  Further research, how-
ever, through a more general theory of judicial "impact, 33 4 could
well investigate the extent to which such decisions and the High
Court itself are accepted and followed by a separate, pro-Court po-
litical constituency. There is evidence, for example, that the Mex-
ican Supreme Court is not blessed with such a strong political
entourage.333  Future research might also pursue such intriguing
comparative data as proportionate budgetary allotments to the ju-
330. The percentages cover the year 1965 and the first nine months of
1966, in which United States District Courts decided 8,618 petitions for federal
habeas corpus, mostly from state prisoners. UNITED STATES CODE: CONGRES-
SIONAL & ADMINISTRATIVE NEWS, 89th Congress, 2d Session 3663-34, 3667 (1967).
331. See text with notes 7-9 supra.
332. See text with notes 290, 294, 315-17, 326-28 supra.
333. See note 203 and accompanying text supra.
334. See THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECIsIoNs (T. Becker ed. 1969).
335. See, e.g., R. BAKER, supra note 5, at 271-72. T. Becker ed., supra
note 334, at 191 points out:
[Iun order for the Court (acting as an institution) to legitimate any-
thing, its decisions must have visibility. Legitimacy, after all is said
and done, must imply a certain level of recognition in the society of
specific actions taken by the Court as well as some knowledge about
the general power of judicial review.
While it is true that the amparo remedy itself is well known and frequently used,
the "visibility" of "specific actions" or decisions of the Supreme Court is not so
evident in Mexico. It would be this writer's estimate, for example, that popular
identification of the United States Court with decisions like Brown v. Board of
1973
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diciary, socio-economic and political backgrounds of Supreme
Court justices, and the incidence and intensity of legislative reprisals
against the courts, for example, through constitutional amendment
or jurisdictional restrictions. 836
The answer to the question posed initially, "how and where
independent?," is of necessity mixed and relative; much depends
on the tribunal and issue area involved. Although both Supreme
Courts rely on a doctrine of political questions as well as other
forms of non-reviewability, the Mexican Court's restrictions pri-
marily flow from specific constitutional and statutory provisions,
and have not been so nearly fraught with exceptions as those of
its United States counterpart. Furthermore, the two differ widely
on the kinds of cases held to be almost or completely non-re-
viewable. Mexico broadly denies its courts amparo jurisdiction
over cases involving free exercise of religion, challenges of elec-
toral counting or administration, dismissals of certain "public
functionaries," summary deportation of persons deemed undesir-
able by the President, direct review of most "decentralized agen-
cies" at the federal level, and agrarian land expropriations. None
of these would be immune from federal judicial review in the
United States as long as individual rights under the Constitution
or statute were properly raised. On the other hand, Mexican
jurists would find it strange that United States Courts traditionally
have abstained from, or severely restricted, review of state and
federal tax laws, military courts-martial and administrative ac-
tions, administrative rationale for deportations, state practices ad-
versely affecting the economic status of resident aliens, and the
interpretation of international treaties and executive agree-
ments.3
37
Education or "busing," the School Prayer Case (Engel v. Vitale), capital pun-
ishment (Furman v. Georgia), or even the Pentagon Papers Case (New York
Times, et. al. v. United States) would find little similarity in Mexico. On the
other hand, such lack of specific recognition can partly be explained by the
"relativity" effect of judicial decisions (affecting only the parties to the case)
which elevates the familiarity of the procedure-i.e., the amparo-rather than
any particular product of that procedure.
336. See, e.g., Fouts, Policy-Making in the Supreme Court of Canada,
1950-1960 in COMPARATVE JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 257, 286-87 (G. Schubert & D.
Danelski eds. 1969), regarding the need for research into various "external in-
fluences on the Supreme Court." See also R. BAKER, supra note 5, on the poten-
tially great but rarely exercised power of Congress to restrict the Mexican Court's
jurisdiction or reverse established decisions under the "amending clause" (article
135) of the Constitution.
337. See sections m and IV supra.
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As to those cases actually reviewed on the merits, there is no
question that the Mexican federal courts have been reluctant to
exercise their constitutional-rights jurisdiction in the independent,
forthright, or comprehensive manner of the United States federal
courts. Tables I through IV bear this out regarding the United
States Supreme Court, as does a recent study finding that during
the period of 1957 to 1968 the Court decided 70 per cent of the
cases surveyed in a way favorable to the "civil rights and civil lib-
erties" position,"s8 It would be safe to assume that the Penal
and Administrative Chambers of the Mexican Court would not
come close to such a figure in similar cases. The Mexican tribunal
has particularly subordinated claims to constitutional protection on
issues involving freedom of political and non-political expression,
association, and demonstration. Relative to United States Su-
preme Court decisions in the first amendment area,-3 9 the Mexi-
can Court has strongly identified with the dominant political alli-
ance, refusing to invalidate statutes where claims of vagueness or
"chilling effects" on free expression were raised.141
On the other hand, the Mexican amparo courts have increas-
ingly chosen not to resort to Professor Bickel's passive virtues in
certain issue areas. Both the Administrative Chamber and Pie-
338. Note, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, 1967-68 Term, 38 REv. JuR. U.P.R. 211, 320-21 (1969), with a
listing of decisions regarding certain asserted rights as follows:
Disposition of Cases by Court
Cumulative: 1957-1968
Favorable Unfavorable Total
Civil Rights 72 9 81
Internal Security 48 27 75
Freedom of Expression 71 21 92
Immigration and Nationality 11 8 19
Other Criminal Proceedings 155 85 240
Total 357 150 507
339. See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967);
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). All carried issues similar to the
disoluci6n social case in the Mexican Court discussed in text with notes 306-13;
the four United States decisions, however, struck down or greatly restricted the
application of laws that punished various kinds of political expression or associa-
tion as the direct threats to the governmental system or public order. In all four
cases, the Court sided clearly with the petitioners who were arguing that the
broad wording of the statutes or the lower court's interpretation of them were
offensive to the first amendment.
340. See the discussion of the disoluci6n social case in the text with notes
306-24 and note 339 supra.
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nary Court have broadly upheld the challenges of small private
farmers, the pequehas propiedades, against the confiscatory ac-
tions of agrarian reform commissions, an area formerly set off
as a political question. Definitive amparo judgments against the
government have also been rendered in cases raising the issues of
income and property taxation; military jurisdiction over non-serv-
ice-connected crimes; courts-martial generally; military policy to-
ward pensions, housing, and salaries; aliens' rights to professional
licenses; and criminal due process issues not involving the anti-
subversive laws."'
It is surprising, in fact, that the Mexican federal courts have
largely charted their own courses, with or without political pres-
sures from local politicos or national elites. The high percentages
of cases won by amparo plaintiffs and the great volume of cases
initiated each year demonstrate that the Mexican judiciary is an
important allocator of values, scarce resources, and sanctions in
the national political system. Clearly, such an authoritative role
can no longer be ignored by scholars in the United States.
341. See generally section IV and text with notes 303-04, 314-17 supra.
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